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ATONING FOR DRED SCOTT AND PLESSY WHILE
SUBSTANTIALLY ABOLISHING THE DEATH PENALTY
Scott W. Howe*
Abstract: Has the Supreme Court adequately atoned for Dred Scott and Plessy? A Court
majority has never confessed and apologized for the horrors associated with those decisions.
And the horrors are so great that Dred Scott and Plessy have become the anti-canon of
constitutional law. Given the extraordinary circumstances surrounding the Court’s historical
complicity in the brutal campaign against African Americans, this Article contends that the
Court could appropriately do more to atone.
The Article asserts that the Court could profitably pursue atonement while abolishing
capital punishment for aggravated murder. The Article shows why substantial abolition of the
capital sanction would constitute a relevant response to the Court’s past complicity in the long,
violent campaign for white supremacy. The Article also explains why substantial abolition,
with a confession and apology, would involve little social cost and could send a
valuable message.
As for how our racial history could help justify substantial abolition in the language of the
Constitution, the Article proposes an approach suggested by decisions in which the Court has
combined two or more clauses to justify an outcome that neither clause would authorize on its
own. In the death-penalty context, the Court could aggregate the prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishments and the command of equal protection. Under that approach, the Court
need not find a national consensus against death-penalty systems, nor must it find purposeful
discrimination. The Court could rely, instead, on the inability to refute that those systems are
remnants of the judicially authorized pursuit of white supremacy. The nature of that conclusion
would also distinguish death from other punishments and thereby solve some problems that
the Court has identified with abolition using a single-clause methodology.
The arguments for vigorous Supreme Court atonement and for limiting the death penalty
connect, although they stand apart. The Court could look for a better context than the death
penalty to apologize for Dred Scott and Plessy, but a better context is hard to fathom. Likewise,
the Court could justify, without apology, restricting the penalty based on our judicially
sanctioned quest for white supremacy, but an apology for Dred Scott and Plessy would add a
healing message. The actions are synergistic. The Court could achieve something special
through the mutually-reinforcing symbolism that could come with simultaneous restriction of
the death sanction and robust atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy.

* Scott W. Howe. Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law,
Chapman University. I want to thank, without implicating, colleagues at the Chapman University
Fowler School of Law who assisted and supported me in the preparation of this Article. Most
importantly, I thank Jetty Maria Howe-Cascante, without whose assistance and support the article
would not have come to fruition.
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INTRODUCTION
From early in the nineteenth century through well into the twentieth,
the United States Supreme Court issued a series of opinions that
undermined the efforts of African Americans to secure their physical
protection, their dignity, and their progress.1 The Court decisions enabled
the violent degradation of black persons2 and branded them as deeply
inferior in a racial hierarchy favoring white supremacy.3 Primary
examples include Dred Scott v. Sanford4 and Plessy v. Ferguson,5 which
are widely viewed by historians and Supreme Court scholars as topping
the list of the worst Supreme Court decisions ever rendered.6 Dred Scott
and Plessy are so widely reviled that they constitute the core of
constitutional law’s anti-canon, along with Lochner v. New York7 and,

1. See, e.g., LAWRENCE GOLDSTONE, INHERENTLY UNEQUAL: THE BETRAYAL OF EQUAL RIGHTS
SUPREME COURT, 1865–1903, at 195–99 (2001) (discussing the complicity of the Supreme
Court in the violent subjugation of black persons in the decades after the Civil War); F. MICHAEL
HIGGINBOTHAM, GHOSTS OF JIM CROW: ENDING RACISM IN POST-RACIAL AMERICA 57–59 (2013)
(discussing the negative effects of the Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott for even free black
persons in the United States at the time); RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE 55–83 (1975)
(discussing the Supreme Court’s participation in the subjugation of black persons from Dred Scott
through Plessy, and concluding that “[b]y the close of the nineteenth century, . . . the Supreme Court
had nullified nearly every vestige of the federal protection that had been cast like a comforting cloak
over the Negro upon his release from bondage”); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF
JIM CROW 53–54 (1955) (noting decisions of the Supreme Court between 1873 and 1898 that
expressed a “weakening of resistance to racism”).
BY THE

2. See, e.g., GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 197 (asserting that Supreme Court decisions in the late
19th century “proclaimed that the government of the United States” was “now firmly of the belief that
the southern part of the Union could again confine the black man to chattel status”); Walter F. Pratt,
Plessy v. Ferguson, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
739 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 2nd ed. 2005) (asserting that the “enduring effect” of the majority opinion
“was to place the Court’s imprimatur on a considerably expanded field in which segregation was
justified”); KLUGER, supra note 1, at 68 (asserting that, in part because the Supreme Court in the
twenty years after the Civil War had “twisted” the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment, it “should
have surprised no one” when black men “began to be lynched”).
3. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 58 (“The ruling in Dred Scott affirmed that blacks,
even free ones, were perceived to be both different from whites and inferior to whites.”); Plessy v.
Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (asserting that the segregation law upheld
by the majority was “a brand of servitude and degradation”). See also Charles L. Black, The
Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421, 426 (1960) (asserting that the “court that
refused to see inequality in” segregation in the South, as the Supreme Court did in Plessy, could only
be acting “based on self-induced blindness, on flagrant contradiction of known fact”).
4. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
5. 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
6. See David G. Savage, How Did They Get It So Wrong?, ABA J. (Jan. 1, 2009),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/how_did_they_get_it_so_wrong
[https://perma.cc/E6M7-GWD8].
7. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
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perhaps, Korematsu v. United States8 at the perimeter.9 They are almost
universally condemned today among law professors, lawyers, and judges
as beyond the pale.10
Given the extraordinary horrors associated with those decisions, this
Article asks whether the Court has made adequate efforts to atone for
them. The Court has never formally apologized for Dred Scott or for
Plessy, although it began undermining Plessy at least by the time of Brown
v. Board of Education,11 a case that falls, along with decisions such as
Marbury v. Madison,12 at the core of constitutional law’s canon.13 Also,
while the Court has taken steps in more modern times to try to protect
racial minorities somewhat from harmful, racial discrimination, it has
avoided explanations that would fully expose its own complicity in the
long reign of white brutality.14
Finding those efforts inadequate, this Article contends that the Court
should do more to pursue redemption. The Article argues for: (1) a

8. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
9. See, e.g., Akhil Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75, 76, 84 (2011)
[hereinafter Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson] (asserting that “three court opinions occupy the lowest circle
of constitutional hell,” which is the “anti-canon”: Dred Scott, Plessy, and Lochner; but suggesting
that Korematsu may also qualify); Jack M. Balkin & Sanford Levinson, Thirteen Ways of Looking at
Dred Scott, 82 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 49, 76 (2007) (asserting that Dred Scott is “the key example” in
the “anti-canon” of constitutional law); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379, 380,
383 (2011) (asserting that Dred Scott, Plessy, Lochner, and Korematsu are the “anticanon” of
American constitutional law, but noting that Korematsu is debatable); Richard A. Primus, Canon,
Anti-Canon and Judicial Dissent, 48 DUKE L. J. 243, 256–57 (1998) (asserting that the majority
opinion in Dred Scott is “surely anti-canonical” and that the majority opinion in Plessy is also “anticanonical”).
10. See Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 77 (asserting that anti-canon cases exemplify
“unwritten constitutionalism run amok”); Primus, supra note 9, at 254 n.41 (describing anti-canon
constitutional texts as ones that we regard as “repulsive” and that have been rejected by canonical
ones). See also Sanford Levinson, Is Dred Scott Really the Worst Opinion of All Time? Why Prigg Is
Worse Than Dred Scott (But Is Likely to Stay Out of the “Anticanon”), 125 HARV. L. REV. F. 23, 23
(2012) (“To embrace any of these cases as commendable, whether in the classroom, at the podium,
or in a legal opinion, would be to reveal that one simply does not know ‘how to think’ as a modern
constitutional lawyer. . . .”).
11. 387 U.S. 483 (1954). See also CAROL S. STEIKER & JORDAN M. STEIKER, COURTING DEATH:
THE SUPREME COURT AND CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 109 (2016) (describing the Brown opinion, as in
several death penalty cases, as having presented “a woefully incomplete picture of the underlying
practice” of enforced segregation).
12. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
13. See, e.g., Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 76 (describing Marbury and Brown as part
of “a constitutional canon”); Greene, supra note 9, at 381 (describing Brown as “a classic example”
of a case belonging to “the constitutional canon”); Primus, supra note 9, at 257 (asserting that “Brown
is a canonical decision”).
14. For an example, see infra text at notes 270–277.
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majority opinion containing a transparent confession of the Court’s
historical errors; (2) a description of the associated harms to African
Americans; (3) institutional apology; and (4) some further action to
underscore the Court’s sincerity.15 The Article urges that there remains
social value in seeking that sort of judicial expiation even after all of the
Court’s past efforts to abandon Dred Scott and Plessy.16 Institutional
purgation could help underscore the humanity of African Americans and
confirm that the Court embraces their continuing quest for equality. That
course could also encourage greater racial reconciliation17 by helping to
“revitalize the public discourse on racial equality”18 and, ultimately, by
promoting “a national reckoning that would lead to spiritual renewal.”19
How could the Court begin to atone in such dramatic fashion so many
years after Brown? This Article advocates that the Court use as its vehicle
the abolition of capital punishment for aggravated murder. Leading
scholars have frequently contended that the modern use of the death
penalty links to the long era of violent degradation of African
Americans.20 The Article explores that idea and concludes that there are
15. See, e.g., MICHAEL E. DYSON, TEARS WE CANNOT STOP: A SERMON TO WHITE AMERICA 100–
05, 197 (2017) (calling for a true “owning up” for “the weight of white transgressions,” including
Dred Scott and Plessy, with sincere apology).
16. The Court’s failure openly to acknowledge and apologize still stains the social consciousness
of many citizens who are well-informed about the Court’s history. See, e.g., JAMES H. CONE, THE
CROSS AND THE LYNCHING TREE 38, 165–66 (2017) (lamenting the “1896 Supreme Court doctrine of
‘separate but equal,’” and concluding that American must confront its history of white supremacy
with repentance); id. (calling for acknowledgment of the errors and for an apology); see also HENRY
LOUIS GATES, JR., STONY THE ROAD: RECONSTRUCTION, WHITE SUPREMACY, AND THE RISE OF JIM
CROW 254 (2019) (asserting that “we in hindsight cannot help but be dismayed at the reversals
signified by [among other acts] . . . the Supreme Court’s overturning of the Civil Rights Act of
1875”); GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 195–99, 203 (characterizing the Court’s nineteenth-century
decisions affecting the civil rights of black persons, including Dred Scott and Plessy, as a “Charade
of Justice”).
17. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 220–21 (asserting the need for government to
“acknowledge culpability” in the racism that continues to exist today and that “[a]wareness and
contrition are important for an effective conversation” that can lead to “racial reconciliation”).
18. Janine Young Kim, Racial Emotions and the Feeling of Equality, 87 U. COLO. L. REV. 437, 439 (2016).
19. Ta-Nehisi
Coates,
The
Case
for
Reparations,
ATLANTIC
(June
2014),
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/
[https://perma.cc/EKS8-23CK] (emphasizing decades of racist housing policy).
20. See, e.g., Stuart Banner, Traces of Slavery: Race and the Death Penalty in Historical
Perspective, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN
AMERICA 96, 97 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006) (“When we think about the
death penalty, we think, in part, in race-tinged pictures—of black victims lynched by white mobs, of
black defendants condemned by white juries, of slave codes and public hangings.”); EQUAL JUSTICE
INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CONFRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR 64 (3d ed.
2017) [hereinafter EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING] https://eji.org/wpcontent/uploads/2019/10/lynching-in-america-3d-ed-080219.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N63Q-8TKF]
(noting that “regional data demonstrates that the modern death penalty in America mirrors racial
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good grounds to believe that the death penalty for aggravated murder
would not have survived had the long, judicially encouraged subjugation
of African Americans never happened.21 On that view, abolition would
constitute a relevant context for the Court to confess the horrors associated
with its past complicity in the violent pursuit of white hegemony. Further,
the violent subjugation of African Americans deserves recognition as one
of the central byproducts of the claims of black inferiority and the
segregation laws that the Court endorsed in Dred Scott and Plessy.22
The Article also addresses cost-benefit questions and concludes that
substantial abolition of the death penalty presents an unusually suitable
opportunity for partial judicial expiation. Ending the death penalty for
aggravated murder would involve little societal sacrifice.23 Indeed, an
important question is whether abolishing it amounts to such a small
sacrifice as to appear insignificant in an effort at apology. The sanction
violence of the past”); Timothy V. Kaufman-Osborn, Capital Punishment as Legal Lynching?, in
FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 21, 49
(Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006) (asserting that “the administration of capital
punishment in the United States, like the practice of lynching, is one of the state practices by means
of which the racial polity is reproduced”); BHARAT MALKANI, SLAVERY AND THE DEATH PENALTY:
A STUDY IN ABOLITION 1 (2018) (“[I]t is widely recognized that capital punishment in the United
States of America continues to be imbued with the legacy of slavery.”); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
Making Race Matter in Death Matters, in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO THE KILLING STATE: RACE AND
THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICA 55, 61 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., & Austin Sarat, eds., 2006) (“The
underlying currents involved in this sordid history—fear, white supremacy, devaluation of black life,
hatred, and a desire to control—may not be exact reasons for the suspicious disparities in capital
punishment today, but one cannot help but wonder whether some of the same impulses are at work.”);
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 111 (“Had the Court framed its constitutional regulation of
capital punishment against the backdrop of antebellum codes, lynchings, mob-dominated trials, and
disparate enforcement patterns, the Court would have done a much better job of explaining why the
American death penalty deserved the sustained attention of the American judiciary.” (emphasis in
original)); FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE CONTRADICTIONS OF AMERICAN CAPITAL PUNISHMENT 122
(2003) (“The states and the region where lynching was dominant show clear domination of recent
executions, while those states with very low historic lynching records are much less likely than
average to have either a death penalty or executions late in the twentieth century.”); John D. Bessler,
What I Think About When I Think About the Death Penalty, 62 ST. LOUIS U. L. REV. 781, 791 (2018)
(“The death penalty has long been associated with the institution of slavery and with rampant
discrimination.”); Stephen Bright, Discrimination, Death, and Denial: The Tolerance of Racial
Discrimination in the Infliction of the Death Penalty, 35 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 439 (1995) (“The
death penalty is a direct descendent of lynching and other forms of racial violence and racial
oppression in America.”); Phyllis Goldfarb, Matters of Strata: Race, Gender, and Class Structures in
Capital Cases, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1395, 1409 (2016) (“When Southern states turned away from
lynching in the twentieth century, . . . we can find examples of officials calling off would-be lynch
mobs by implicitly promising capital punishment as law’s alternative route to a parallel outcome.”)..
21. See infra notes 401–404 and accompanying text.
22. See infra notes 201–233 and accompanying text.
23. See infra notes 414–432 and accompanying text.
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today is carried out so rarely and haphazardly, and so long after the crime,
that it could hardly have much marginal crime-deterrent value over
perpetual imprisonment.24 Its marginal retributive value is also modest at
best and tainted by the racial prejudice that infests it.25 The penalty
functions primarily as a symbol.26 Yet for many who are most troubled by
our racial history it is a symbol of the legacy of a barbarous pursuit of
white supremacy,27 which is why judicial abolition of its use in aggravated
murder cases could serve as partial judicial atonement for Dred Scott
and Plessy.
As for how history could help justify abolition in the language of the
Constitution, the Article proposes an approach that is novel in deathpenalty jurisprudence but that the Court has occasionally employed in
other areas of constitutional law. This methodology involves combining
clauses to justify a protection that no single clause would authorize on its
own. While the Court has not commonly recognized multiple-clause
rights, it has done so often enough to make the idea plausible in the deathpenalty context.28 Most recently, in Obergefell v. Hodges,29 the Court
noted a “synergy”30 between the Equal Protection and Due Process
Clauses that it said had helped justify its previous recognition of several
protections and, in the case at hand, its recognition of a right to same-sex
marriage.31 Another example is Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,32 in which
the Court combined the First Amendment rights to free speech and to
association to justify a right of “expressive association” that the Court said
allowed the Boy Scouts to exclude gay men from adult membership.33
24. See infra notes 425–432 and accompanying text.
25. See infra notes 421–423 and accompanying text.
26. See Scott W. Howe, Capital-Sentencing Law and the New Conservative Court, 2018 CARDOZO L.
REV. DE NOVO 157, 171 (asserting that for some, it represents “white supremacy”—“a history of racial
oppression and savagery” while, for others, it represents “the idea that . . . we might get what we deserve”).
27. See, e.g., CONE, supra note 16, at 163 (“Nothing is more racist in America’s criminal justice
system than its administration of the death penalty[, which] . . . is why the term ‘legal lynching’ is
still relevant today.” (footnotes omitted)); JESSE L. JACKSON, SR., JESSE L. JACKSON, JR., & BRUCE
SHAPIRO, LEGAL LYNCHING 72 (2001) (“Yet, there is a special relationship between the death penalty
and African-Americans, a relationship going back to antebellum days, when the gallows was a
principle means of punishing slaves, and on through the worst years of Jim Crow.”).
28. For some instances in which the Court has employed the doctrine, see Scott W. Howe, Constitution
Clause Aggregation and the Marijuana Crimes, 75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 779, 830–44 (2018).
29. 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
30. Id. at 2603.
31. See id. at 2602–03 (concluding that the right of same-sex couples to marry “that is part of the
liberty promised by the Fourteenth Amendment is derived, too, from that Amendment’s guarantee of
the equal protection of the laws”).
32. 530 U.S. 640, 644 (2000).
33. See id. at 648–53 (“Forcing a group to accept certain members may impair the ability of the
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Regarding capital punishment, the Court could combine the equal
protection command and the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments to support abolition, although neither alone, according to the
Court, can support that outcome.34 Under this approach, the Court need
not find that such systems reflect purposeful discrimination—as required
by the equal protection clause—or that a national consensus against deathpenalty systems already exists—as required by the cruel and unusual
punishment prohibition. It could be enough to hold that we cannot refute
that those systems are remnants of the judicially legitimized pursuit of
white supremacy. Given our understanding of the illegitimacy of state
efforts to enforce the racial hierarchy and of Dred Scott and Plessy, the
Court would appropriately resolve doubts over whether the death penalty
would still exist had those wrongs never happened, in favor of abolition.35
The nature of such a conclusion would also help distinguish death from
other punishments and thereby solve some problems that the Court has
identified with abolition using a single-clause methodology.36 This
approach can justify substantial abolition of the death sanction whether or
not the Court apologizes for its historical role in promoting the “colorline”37 and for the associated harms. However, as part of an atonement
effort, the Court could also offer a forceful apology.
The Article does not advocate complete judicial abolition of the death
penalty, which avoids a separate problem based on constitutional text. The
argument for abolition based on the nation’s inglorious quest for white
supremacy need not apply to capital punishment for extraordinary crimes
against the state, including “treason, espionage, terrorism, and drug
kingpin activity.”38 There is no equivalent argument that those offenses
are associated with the discriminatory abuse of African Americans or the
maintenance of a white-dominated, racial hierarchy.39 Consistent with that
view, the Article makes the case for abolition only in cases of crime
group to express those views, and only those views, that it intends to express.”).
34. See, e.g., McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 319 (1987) (rejecting separate challenges to the
Georgia death-sentencing system brought under the Equal Protection and Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clauses).
35. Death sentences have become increasingly uncommon since the 1990s. See DEATH PENALTY INFO.
CTR., FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY 3 (2019), https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Q3GA-ZX9D] (revealing that annual death sentences dropped from 295 in 1998 to 42 in
2018).
36. See infra notes 479–481 and accompanying text.
37. W. E. B. DU BOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 11 (Univ. of N.C. Press 2013) (1903).
38. Kennedy v. Louisiana, 554 U.S. 407, 437 (2008).
39. For the evidence of such racialized use of the sanction in crimes against individuals, see infra
text at notes 373–31.
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against individual persons, particularly aggravated murder,40 the only
offense against individuals for which the Court has continued to allow the
death penalty.41 Because the sanction could continue to apply
constitutionally to some extraordinary crimes against the state, there
would be no contravention of the language in the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments that contemplates the possibility of capital punishment in
unspecified circumstances.42
The Article proceeds in five stages. Part II describes how the Supreme
Court participated in the decades-long degradation and brutalization of
African Americans through a series of opinions, particularly in Dred Scott
and Plessy. Part III describes how the Court later failed to atone according
to a standard that calls for transparent confession and apology. Part IV
overcomes various possible objections to judicial atonement that allege,
for example, that Dred Scott and Plessy were not wrong when rendered,43
that the decisions did not materially contribute to black oppression, or that
confession and apology would risk fostering unproductive illusions of
white redemption and black power by acknowledging and responding to
black victimization. Part V explains why, in pursuit of Supreme Court
expiation, abolition of the death penalty for aggravated murder is a
relevant, partial measure and, indeed, why that course would respond to
the punishment’s historical symbiosis with the color-line even were the
Court not to apologize for Dred Scott and Plessy. Finally, Part VI explains
the benefits of a dual-clause theory to reject the death penalty and pursue
atonement for our history of Court-endorsed racial oppression.

40. This formulation also leaves open that certain murders, such as the assassination of certain
government employees or murders associated with political terrorism, could remain punishable by
the death penalty.
41. In rejecting the death penalty for child-rape and other non-homicidal crimes against individuals,
the Kennedy majority asserted that, “in determining whether the death penalty is excessive, there is a
distinction between intentional first-degree murder on the one hand and nonhomicide crimes against
individual persons, even including child rape, on the other.” Kennedy, 554 U.S. at 438.
42. The Fifth Amendment provides in part that “[n]o person shall be held to answer for a capital,
or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury . . . nor be
deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law . . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. V. The
Fourteenth Amendment provides in part that no state shall “deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law. . . .” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
43. See, e.g., MARK A. GRABER, DRED SCOTT AND THE PROBLEM OF CONSTITUTIONAL EVIL 28
(2006) (“Taney’s constitutional claims in Dred Scott were well within the mainstream of antebellum
constitutional thought.”); MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 9 (2004) (“Plessy-era race decisions were
plausible interpretations of conventional legal sources: text, original intent, precedent, and custom.”).
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THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL ATONEMENT: SUPREME COURT
COMPLICITY IN THE DEGRADATION OF BLACK PERSONS

As a historical matter, the Supreme Court has treated black people
horribly and even inhumanely.44 From before the Civil War through well
into the twentieth century, the Supreme Court largely, although not
entirely, abjured from efforts to describe the Constitution as safeguarding
them.45 In the antebellum era, the Court sometimes unnecessarily found
implied rights for slave owners and a lack of rights for blacks46 in part out
of an effort to appease the slaveholding interests concentrated in the
South.47 From that period, the most infamous of the rulings was Dred
Scott.48 In the postbellum era through the early twentieth century, the
Court gave a few narrow rulings for African Americans,49 but generally
44. See infra notes 52–195 and accompanying text.
45. For discussion of some decisions by the Court during the 1800s that were favorable to black
persons, see infra notes 153–162 and accompanying text.
46. See, e.g., Akhil R. Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term; Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARV. L. REV. 26, 65 (2000) [hereinafter Amar, The Supreme Court] (asserting that
“[t]he Philadelphia Constitution was pro-slavery, but the Taney Court was far worse, and grossly
dismissive of the rights of free blacks”).
47. From the end of the eighteenth century through the Civil War, the importance of slavery to the
economic interests of the southern states and to the nation as a whole was tied largely to the production
of cotton, which Eli Whitney’s invention of the cotton gin had greatly stimulated. See IRA BERLIN,
MANY THOUSANDS GONE: THE FIRST TWO CENTURIES OF SLAVERY IN NORTH AMERICA 307, 359–
60 (1998); JOHN H. FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS, JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A HISTORY
OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 100 (8th ed. 2001). “For most of the period before the Civil War, the United
States was the source of close to 80 percent of the cotton imported by British manufacturers.” WALTER
JOHNSON, RIVER OF DARK DREAMS: SLAVERY AND EMPIRE IN THE COTTON KINGDOM 10 (2013). The
economic interest to the southern states but northern states as well in maintaining slavery to produce
cotton was substantiated in an 1832 U.S. government document revealing “that cotton not only
dominated US exports and the financial sector but also drove the expansion of northern industry.”
EDWARD E. BAPTIST, THE HALF HAS NEVER BEEN TOLD: SLAVERY AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN
CAPITALISM 273 (2014). “By the middle of the century southern masters ruled over the wealthiest and
most dynamic slave society the world had ever known.” MATTHEW KARP, THIS VAST SOUTHERN
EMPIRE: SLAVEHOLDERS AT THE HELM OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 2 (2016). Corresponding with
increasing demand for labor in the “Cotton Kingdom,” the “number of American slaves increased
from 1.5 million in 1820 to nearly 4 million in 1860.” DAVID B. DAVIS, INHUMAN BONDAGE: THE
RISE AND FALL OF SLAVERY IN THE NEW WORLD 182 (2006). By 1860, “prime field hands were
selling for $1,000 in Virginia and $1,800 in New Orleans.” FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra at 134.
48. See ERIC FONER, THE FIERY TRIAL: ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND AMERICAN SLAVERY 93 (2010)
(concurring that it was “[t]he most important decision” ever rendered by the Supreme Court and one
that damned Taney to enduring fame).
49. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 1, at 64, 83 (asserting that “three jury cases added up to a
gain . . . in rhetoric” for blacks, but concluding that “[b]y the close of the nineteenth century,” the
Supreme Court had neutered almost all of the federal protection that the Reconstruction Amendments
had conferred on blacks); Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70–71 (contending that, after
the Civil War, the Court failed to faithfully interpret the “Constitution’s new enforcement clauses,”
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ruled so as to allow their continued subjugation.50 The most infamous such
ruling of that era was Plessy.51
A. The Antebellum Period: Dred Scott
Dred Scott was not the only decision of the Court in the antebellum
period that zealously protected the rights of slave owners,52 but it was
among the most extreme in promoting slavery and the most explicitly
degrading toward humans of African descent.53 That is perhaps why
American legal and constitutional scholars commonly view it today as
“almost certainly the worst judicial ruling in American constitutional
history.”54 The explanation for the Court’s extremism was more
complicated than simply a total antipathy toward blacks. In another
decision from that era, United States v. The Amistad,55 the Court—
including its several southern members56—voted to free numerous black
Africans carried on a Spanish ship by Spanish slave traders in violation of
Spanish laws that arrived, after an uprising, off of Long Island.57 Scholars
suspect that key to the ruling was that The Amistad did not involve
demands for accommodation of important slave interests in the
United States.58
Other decisions of that era that implicated the slavery concerns of
southern states consistently “represented victories for those who favored
sectional accommodation.”59 Considered with the ruling in The Amistad,
those outcomes suggest that a misguided quest by the Court to avoid
and essentially disregarded much of the core meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments).
50. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 53–54 (asserting that the Court “was engaged in a bit
of reconciliation” achieved at the expense of black people).
51. See Cheryl I. Harris, The Story of Plessy v. Ferguson: The Death and Resurrection of Racial
Formalism, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 181, 181 (Michael C. Dorf ed., 2004) (noting that
Plessy “is often denounced as a judicial travesty on par with Dred Scott”).
52. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506 (1859); Strader v. Graham, 51 U.S. (10
How.) 82 (1851); Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842); The Antelope, 23 U.S. (10
Wheat.) 66 (1825).
53. See infra notes 120–128 and accompanying text.
54. Christopher L. Eisgruber, The Story of Dred Scott: Originalism’s Forgotten Past, in
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW STORIES 151, 151 (Michael C. Dorf, ed., 2004). See also Walter Ehrlich, Scott
v. Sandford, in OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 761 (Kermit
L. Hall, ed., 1992) (asserting that American legal and constitutional scholars “consider the Dred Scott
decision to be the worst ever rendered by the Supreme Court”).
55. 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518 (1841).
56. See EARL M. MALTZ, SLAVERY AND THE SUPREME COURT, 1825–61, 114 (2009).
57. See id.
58. See id.
59. Id.
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dissolution of the Union, should slave owners and others who benefited
from slavery not feel sufficiently appeased,60 also operated in some way
behind the stated reasons in the pro-slavery decisions.61 Yet, while Chief
Justice Taney’s pro-slavery opinion for the Court in Dred Scott also may
have rested in some sense on that rationale,62 it remained unusually
transparent among Supreme Court edicts in advocating white hegemony.
None of the other pro-slavery decisions reached the extremes of Taney’s
explicit abasement of blacks and their lack of legal protections against
white domination.63
The Dred Scott case concerned a slave who had originally sued his
nominal white owner for his freedom in Missouri state court.64 Missouri
had been admitted to the Union in 1821 as a slave state under the Missouri
Compromise of 1820,65 through which Maine was to enter as a free state
(thus maintaining the balance between slave and free states) and all land
north of 36˚ 30’ not located within Missouri was to remain forever free.66
Dred Scott claimed that because a former owner had taken him to reside
for a half-dozen years67 in the free state of Illinois and then to Fort
Snelling, in federal territory that is now Minnesota, where slavery was
banned, he could not be re-enslaved when returned to Missouri.68 The
legal consequences seemingly would have differed if Scott had absconded
to a free jurisdiction, because he would have then risked recapture and
return under the Constitution’s Fugitive Slave Clause69 and under federal
60. See, e.g., William E. Nelson, The Impact of the Antislavery Movement Upon Styles of Judicial
Reasoning in Nineteenth Century America, 87 HARV. L. REV. 513, 539 (1974) (asserting, for example,
that the Prigg decision “rested on an instrumentalist concern for national unity”).
61. Industry in northern states in the decades before the Civil War was also greatly spurred by the cotton
production in the South, which was, in turn, enabled by slavery. See BAPTIST, supra note 47, at 317.
62. See GRABER, supra note 43, at 13 (“In Dred Scott, the Supreme Court fostered sectional
moderation by replacing the original Constitution’s failing political protections for slavery with
legally enforceable protections acceptable to Jacksonians in the free and slave states.”).
63. See, e.g., HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 58 (“Dred Scott’s legacy lies in the Supreme Court’s
determination that blacks, whether slave or free, were not citizens, and therefore were not entitled to
constitutional protection.”).
64. See DON E. FEHRENBACHER, THE DRED SCOTT CASE: ITS SIGNIFICANCE IN AMERICAN LAW
(1978).

AND POLITICS 250–53

65. See LORENZO J. GREENE, GARY R KREMER & ANTONIO F. HOLLAND, MISSOURI’S BLACK
HERITAGE 23–24 (rev. ed. 1993).
66. See id.; FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 107–13.
67. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 242–45.
68. See EARL M. MALTZ, DRED SCOTT AND THE POLITICS OF SLAVERY 63–64 (2007).
69. “No person held to service or labour in one state, under the laws thereof, escaping into another, shall,
in consequence of any law or regulation therein, be discharged from such service or labour, but shall be
delivered upon claim of the party to whom such service or labour may be due.” U.S. CONST., art. IV, § 2, cl. 3.
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legislation.70 However, the Missouri courts had “consistently held” that
residence in a free jurisdiction “for even a short period” with the owner’s
permission could “effectively prevent the reattachment of the status of
slavery when the former slave returned to Missouri.”71 That view
accorded with a widely-adopted nineteenth century common-law
doctrine.72 Yet, despite those precedents, the Missouri Supreme Court
ruled two-to-one against Scott, concluding that where—after residence in
a free jurisdiction—a slave’s return to Missouri was voluntary,
reattachment would apply.73
Rather than appeal directly to the United States Supreme Court, Scott’s
lawyers instituted a new suit in federal court alleging common-law claims
and jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, asserting that Scott was
a citizen of Missouri and his nominal owner was a citizen of New York.74
His claims in state court had rested on the common law of Missouri, not
the Constitution or a federal statute.75 In another case involving a slave
claiming his freedom, Strader v. Graham,76 the Supreme Court had
declared itself without authority to overturn a state supreme court’s
declaration as to the common law of the state.77 Also, in that era,78 Swift
v. Tyson79 arguably allowed federal courts resolving a diversity action
based on the common law to decide independently on the governing
rule.80 Yet Scott lost after trial when the federal circuit judge hearing the
case, Robert Wells, followed the reasoning of the Missouri Supreme Court
and held that Scott remained a slave in Missouri.81 Scott’s case then
proceeded to the United States Supreme Court.82

70. See Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 153.
71. MALTZ, supra note 56, at 212. See also Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 153 (noting the legal
difference between a slave that absconded versus one that resided in a free jurisdiction with the
owner’s permission).
72. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 50–61. British precedents also favored Dred Scott’s
position. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 64.
73. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 66–70.
74. See Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 155.
75. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 71.
76. 51 U.S. (10 How.) 82 (1851).
77. See id. at 94.
78. The rule was changed in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
79. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
80. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 71.
81. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 276–80.
82. See Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 156.
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The high court ruled against Scott, seven-to-two.83 The official reporter
declared Chief Justice Taney’s opinion as “of the Court,”84 and Taney
rejected Scott’s appeal on multiple grounds.85 Each of the other eight
justices wrote separately, and there has been substantial controversy over
whether a majority agreed with all of Taney’s rulings.86 However, a search
for explicit disagreement with Taney’s opinion by the other justices
reveals that “none of the major rulings in Taney’s opinion can be pushed
aside as unauthoritative.”87 Indeed, the “common convention” has been to
accept Taney’s opinion as providing the rulings of the Court.88
Despite widespread support for slavery at the time, the Court could
have ruled for Scott.89 Although against the prevailing view of that era, as
Michael Higginbotham notes, the Court could have concluded, “on the
basis of precedent, that Scott, as a free person, had rights and privileges
just like whites.”90 We should not forget that there were hundreds of
thousands of free black persons living in the United States at that point.91
And, while the original Constitution contained “no less than ten clauses”
that “directly or indirectly accommodated” slavery,92 none of them said
anything about the rights of free black persons.93
Moreover, if the Court was not going to rule for Scott,94 it could simply
have affirmed the ruling of Judge Wells that the issue was one of local
83. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 322.
84. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 399 (1856).
85. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 323.
86. See id. at 324–33.
87. Id. at 333.
88. Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 157. See also FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 334 (“As a matter
of historical reality, the Court decided what Taney declared that it decided.”).
89. Even apart from the ruling against Scott, several of Taney’s pronouncements about slavery and
the status of black persons were widely and deeply disturbing even in the antebellum era. See infra
text at notes 95–128; see also STEPHEN R. OATES, WITH MALICE TOWARD NONE: A LIFE OF
ABRAHAM LINCOLN 131–32 (1977) (noting that the decision “shocked Republicans everywhere” and
that they “set about mobilizing Northern opinion against it,” including by arguing that it conflicted
with Democratic presidential candidate Stephen Douglas’s doctrine of “popular sovereignty”
regarding slavery).
90. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 59.
91. See, e.g., Erin Bradford, Free African American Population in the U.S.: 1790–1860, NCPEDIA
(2008), https://www.ncpedia.org/sites/default/files/census_stats_1790-1860.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J6WM-EAPS] (reporting, based on census data, a total of 476,748 free African
Americans residing in the U.S. in 1860).
92. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA,
1760–1848, 62 (1977).
93. See id. at 62–63 (quoting the ten clauses).
94. On this score, see GRABER, supra note 43, at 28–29 (“The judicial denial of black citizenship reflected
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property law and that Scott remained a slave under the common law of
Missouri, as determined by the Missouri Supreme Court.95 On that basis,
the Court could have declared that, assuming Scott could bring a suit in
federal court, he could not win on the merits, because Missouri common
law controlled. On that same basis, assuming the Court wanted to resolve
the case on jurisdictional grounds, Taney could have said that diverse
citizenship was lacking, because Scott was a slave and not a citizen in
Missouri. Instead, Taney reached out “to settle issues far beyond the
dictates of judicial restraint,”96 and, in doing so, acted unwisely.97
Taney unnecessarily pronounced that Congress had no power to restrict
slavery in the territories, such as it purported to do in the Missouri
Compromise, and, for that reason, Scott had not become a free man during
his time at Fort Snelling.98 The reasoning given was verbose,99 but
concluded with the idea that a slave owner had a substantive due process
right to take a slave to reside in free jurisdictions without losing
ownership.100 Taney “said nothing to justify use of the due-process clause
as a restraint upon legislative power—that is, as a limitation upon the
substance of law and not merely upon the manner of its enforcement.”101
More importantly, he invoked this methodology “to produce a profoundly
immoral decision.”102 He ignored that the due process clause extended its
“liberty” protection to every “person” in the country,103 and that even
beliefs held by the overwhelming majority of antebellum jurists in both the North and the South.”).
95. See HOWARD N. MEYER, THE AMENDMENT THAT REFUSED TO DIE 19 (2000); see also
FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 324 (noting that seven justices agreed that the law of Missouri
determined Dred Scott’s slave status when he had returned there).
96. KLUGER, supra note 1, at 55.
97. See, e.g., FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 335–36; (asserting that “there has always been
a . . . conviction that the Dred Scott decision was egregiously wrong or at least exceedingly unwise”);
GRABER, supra note 43, at 56 (asserting that Taney “overreached” by claiming that “the African race
never have been acknowledged as belonging to the family of nations” (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Herbert Storing, Slavery and the Moral Foundations of the American Republic, in TOWARD
A MORE PERFECT UNION: WRITINGS OF HERBERT J. STORING 131, 134 (Joseph M. Bessette ed., 1995)
(asserting that Taney’s argument that the founders viewed black persons as without rights was a “gross
calumny,” because the founders generally understood that blacks were persons “endowed with
unalienable rights,” and “the injustice of slavery was very generally acknowledged”).
98. See, e.g., Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70 (rejecting as “absurd” Taney’s view
that the Constitution disallowed “federal laws excluding slavery from various federal territories”).
99. See FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 379 (noting that Taney used nineteen pages to say something
he could have said in a few sentences—that the Bill of Rights was operative in the territories).
100. See Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 452 (1857).
101. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 382.
102. Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 180. But, cf., GRABER, supra note 43, at 83 (“Slavery was
embedded in a way of life that most Southerners and some Northerners thought intrinsically valuable
and expressive of the highest constitutional aspirations.”).
103. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (“No person shall be . . . deprived of life, liberty or property,
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slaves were “persons” according to the Constitution,104 which suggested
that they had competing due process rights that protected their liberty.105
Acknowledging that point meant at least that slaves were not plausibly
viewed merely as “property in the same sense that hogs and horses”
were.106 Taney was also undeterred by the unavoidable realization that
declaring Congress to lack power to “exclude slavery from the territories”
would outrage many in the North by undermining the Republican party’s
“antiextensionist” platform and by limiting Democrat Stephen Douglas’s
“‘much vaunted’ doctrine of popular sovereignty.”107
If Taney’s opinion had done no more, it would have remained incendiary
in its time,108 but it might not have ended up in the anti-canon of constitutional
law. After all, there were other Supreme Court opinions from that era that
fanatically promoted slavery interests but that never achieved Dred Scott’s
enduring and widespread infamy.109 One example, also appalling, is Prigg v.
Pennsylvania,110 in which the Court nullified the “personal liberty” laws of
free states like Pennsylvania to enable slave hunters to kidnap black
persons—even children who could not plausibly be slaves—from free to
slave states on the mere claim that they were fugitive slaves.111 In theory,
upon their delivery to a slave state, free blacks erroneously seized could still
without due process of law . . . .”).
104. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the
several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which
shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to a
Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.”).
105. To avoid this point, Taney “consistently spoke of the rights of ‘citizens’ in the territories,
rather than the rights of ‘persons’ there.” FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 382.
106. ABRAHAM LINCOLN, II COLLECTED WORKS OF ABRAHAM LINCOLN 245 (Roy P. Basler ed., 1953).
Despite the violence, degradation and deprivation that slavery imposed on its victims, “it was the
lasting contribution of slaves to create an artistic yield that matched their enormous gift of labor, in
tobacco and cotton, to the American economy.” STERLING STUCKEY, SLAVE CULTURE: NATIONALIST
THEORY AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF BLACK AMERICA, at xxiii (25th anniversary ed., 2013).
107. OATES, supra note 89, at 131–32.
108. See id. While Dred Scott immediately infuriated Republicans, “the racist and proslavery
principles” that Taney relied on “had strong roots in both the Constitution and the American political
tradition.” GRABER, supra note 43, at 76. “For Southern Jacksonian jurists during the mid-nineteenth
century, [constitutional] values included both slavery and white supremacy.” Id.
109. See, e.g., Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 506, 526 (1859) (upholding a federal, fugitive
slave statute under which an alleged fugitive slave who claimed mistaken identity could not testify
and was subject to a juryless proceeding in which the magistrate would receive ten dollars for a ruling
for the slave catcher but only five dollars for a ruling for the black person). See also Amar, The
Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70 (describing the statute in question and concluding that it was a
“constitutional travesty,” although the Court in Ableman declared it constitutional).
110. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
111. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 29–30 (explaining the effect of Prigg).
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sue for their freedom in the courts of the slave state,112 and a slave catcher
could also be criminally liable there “for kidnapping a free man.”113 Yet many
blacks lacked the resources and ability to sue, and few “could rebut the
presumption against freedom with appropriate documentation or witness
testimony.”114 As for slave hunters facing kidnapping charges, they “were
rarely if ever prosecuted for pretextually seizing free blacks.”115 Therefore,
Prigg in many circumstances encouraged whites to kidnap free blacks to try
to enslave them.116 Sanford Levinson has concluded that Prigg was “worse”
than Dred Scott regarding the immediate effect on free blacks.117
Nonetheless, Prigg is not part of the anti-canon.118 Part of the reason, perhaps,
is that Prigg did not openly and repeatedly degrade black people by declaring
them inherently and profoundly inferior.119
Unlike in Prigg, Taney’s Dred Scott opinion explicitly pronounced that all
blacks who were slaves or born in the United States120 were naturally
subjugated to white men and unworthy of citizenship. These insults may have
given the opinion its enduring infamy.121 He pronounced that blacks,
compared to whites, were lesser beings by so much that they were, in
constitutional terms, closer to livestock.122 Indeed, he wrote that blacks were
“so far inferior, that they had no rights which the white man was bound to
respect.”123 Without data, he asserted universal agreement among civilized
persons that blacks were lesser beings.124 His opinion offered “twenty-one
112. See MALTZ, supra note 56, at 111.
113. Id. at 110.
114. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 54.
115. MALTZ, supra note 56, at 110.
116. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 54 (asserting that “Prigg provided an invitation for
whites to kidnap free blacks”); MALTZ, supra note 56, at 111 (noting that the federal statute that the
Court found to preempt the Pennsylvania statute in Prigg “placed free blacks at risk”).
117. See Levinson, supra note 10, at 29–30; see also Greene, supra note 9, at 428 (asserting that
Prigg “could easily be called the worst Supreme Court decision ever issued”).
118. See Greene, supra note 9, at 383.
119. Sanford Levinson has asked whether part of the explanation may be the status of Justice Story,
Prigg’s author, as “probably the major legal figure of the American republic prior to the Civil War,”
buttressed by Story’s role as the first Dane Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. See Levinson,
supra note 10, at 31.
120. Technically, “Taney did not reject black citizenship per se,” because the “only persons Dred
Scott declared permanently ineligible for citizenship were free blacks and slaves born in the United
States.” GRABER, supra note 43, at 20.
121. See, e.g., Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70 (rejecting as “absurd” Taney’s
“proclamation that free blacks could never be citizens”).
122. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 451 (1857) (asserting that the Constitution “makes no
distinction” between “the right of property of the master in a slave” and “other property owned by a citizen”).
123. Id. at 407.
124. See id. at 407–09.
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references to blacks as inferior and whites as superior.”125 The highest court
of the United States thereby explicitly endorsed the virulently “racist
doctrine”126 that black people were essentially sub-human, worthy of no
better than slavery.127 The level of enduring harm to African Americans from
those pronouncements has been incalculable.128
B.

The Postbellum Period: Plessy

After the Civil War, the Reconstruction Amendments to the
Constitution129 along with new federal legislation protecting civil rights130
125. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 59.
126. FEHRENBACHER, supra note 64, at 582.
127. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 59 (asserting that the opinion conveyed that “[s]lavery
was the appropriate place for such inferior beings”).
128. For argument that the 1954 decision in Brown “erased Dred Scott” by making African Americans, in the
eyes of the law, “[n]o longer ‘beings of an inferior race,’” see United States v. Jefferson Cty. Bd. of Educ., 372 F.2d
836, 873 (5th Cir. 1966).
Consider, however, the moving account of an African American, Justice Clarence Thomas, about driving with
his young wife and baby son in an old, foreign car from Yale University to Savannah, Georgia, in 1973, for summer
employment after his second year of law school. See CLARENCE THOMAS, MY GRANDFATHER’S SON 81 (2007).
“The prospect of driving through the South frightened me, with good reason,” he reported. Id. at 81. Indeed, as soon
the couple crossed into North Carolina, they saw a billboard that read: “The United Klans of America Welcome
You.” Id. Unfortunately, they soon had car trouble. Id. Thomas was “sick with worry,” presumably because he
knew the law could not provide him and his family with equal protection. Id. After many problems and a “bad
night’s sleep” in a motel that would put them up, the car failed as they pulled into a gas station in a small town in
South Carolina. Id. at _. Fortunately, the owner helped them. Id. He was African American. See id.
129. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments “were designed to give Congress
broad powers to protect civil rights and civil liberties” and together “form Congress’s Reconstruction
Power.” Jack M. Balkin, The Reconstruction Power, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1801, 1805 (2010). The
Thirteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in January 1865 and ratified by the states in
December 1865; the Fourteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in June 1866 and ratified by the
states in June 1868; and the Fifteenth Amendment was passed by Congress in February 1869 and
ratified by the states in February 1870. See id. at 1808 n.27. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited
“slavery” and “involuntary servitude,” except “as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 1. The Fourteenth Amendment declared that “[a]ll
persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. It also declared,
inter alia, that “No state shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.” Id. The Fifteenth Amendment mandated that the “right of citizens of the
United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.” U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1. Each of these
amendments contained an enforcement clause: “Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, Section 5 of
the Fourteenth Amendment, and Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment,” the language of which in
each case is “virtually identical, giving Congress the ‘power to enforce’ the provisions of the
amendment ‘by appropriate legislation.’” Balkin, supra note 129, at 1808.
130. Congress passed numerous statutes during Reconstruction that aimed to protect black citizens.
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reflected an effort to atone for the prior mistreatment of blacks, but the
doctrine of the Supreme Court was less contrite.131 The Court often did
not live up to its purported role to “do justice, free, as far as the lot of
humanity admits, from party passion or political expediency.”132 Instead,
the postbellum Court played a central role in the “long nightmare of
disenfranchisement, segregation, and racial violence”133 that followed the
formal end of Reconstruction in 1877.134 “Through unfriendly statutory
construction or outright invalidation, the Court reined in a great many
federal civil rights laws that sought to protect blacks,” although the
“Constitution’s new enforcement clauses explicitly authorized” those
statutes in “sweeping language.”135 The Court’s interpretations of the
Reconstruction Amendments themselves also effectively neutered the
work of Congress to amend the Constitution to protect African Americans
and their supporters.136
While, in retrospect, the most infamous judicial decision in the
postbellum denial of equal protection for blacks came in 1896 in Plessy,137
the Court’s hostility to Reconstruction rights was on display over a long

For example, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 provided that black citizens should enjoy equal rights in
various respects and provided criminal penalties against any person found guilty of depriving citizens
of those stated rights due to race, color, or previous condition of servitude. See Civil Rights Act of
1866, ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) (reenacted by Enforcement Act of 1870, ch. 114, § 18, 16 Stat. 140,
144 (1870)). Likewise, the Civil Rights Act of 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act, provided
for federal supervision of state elections and aimed to protect black citizens against illegal
intimidation. See Ku Klux Klan Act, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Also, the Civil Rights Act of 1875
provided for equal enjoyment of public accommodations, including theaters, hotels, and modes of
transportation, protected the rights of black citizens to serve as jurors, and gave blacks the right to sue
for personal damages for violations. See Civil Rights Act of 1875, ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875).
131. See Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70.
132. Summary of Events, 1 AM. L. REV. 572, 574 (1867).
133. FONER, supra note 48, at 335; see also GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 12 (describing the Court
as a “central player” in the “descent” into “enforced segregation” and “a nation where human beings
could be tortured and horribly murdered without trial”); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 71, 83
(asserting that the Court went beyond the appropriate imposition of “checks and balances” and
ultimately “opened the floodgates to blatant segregation and discrimination”).
134. Harris, supra note 51, at 192 (describing the “formal demise of Reconstruction” that came
about in 1877 to end the impasse over the presidential election of 1876).
135. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 70–71; see also Balkin, supra note 129, at 1861
(“Time and again, the Supreme Court hobbled Congress’s enforcement powers through specious
technicalities and artificial distinctions.”).
136. See MEYER, supra note 95, at 85. See also Dorothy E. Roberts, Foreword: Abolition
Constitutionalism, 133 HARV. L. REV. 3, 74 (2019) (“The Court also ‘crippled’ the federal
government’s power to enforce the Reconstruction Amendments to protect blacks from white terror,
speeding the collapse of Reconstruction in the South.”).
137. See Greene, supra note 9, at 396 (explaining based on empirical evidence that Plessy alone
among such cases falls “within the anticanon”).

10 Howe.docx (Do Not Delete)

756

5/30/20 11:47 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:737

period that began much earlier.138 In 1872, in Blyew v. United States,139
the Court narrowly construed the Civil Rights Act of 1866 so as not to
strike down a Kentucky statute that forbade the testimony of a black
person against a white person in a criminal case.140 In the Slaughter House
Cases141 of 1873 and in United States v. Reese142 and United States v.
Cruikshank143 from 1876, the Court “drastically curtailed the privileges
and immunities recognized as being under federal protection”144 and
effectively limited, among others, the right of African Americans to vote,
which supposedly “had been guaranteed by the Fifteenth Amendment.”145
138. The Court was not always out of line with national sentiment on civil rights in the decades
after the Civil War. See Michael J. Klarman, Court, Congress, and Civil Rights, in CONGRESS AND
THE CONSTITUTION 173, 175 (Neal Devins & Keith E. Whittington eds., 2005). By the time of the
formal end of Reconstruction in 1877, “northern opinion” had become “increasingly dubious about
federal intervention” in the South, and “military enforcement was no longer politically practicable”
to promote the legal reforms enacted during the Reconstruction decade. KLARMAN, supra note 43, at
10. Moreover, by that point, “virtually the entire South had been retaken—’redeemed’—by the
political forces that had championed the Confederacy.” RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE
LAW 41 (1997). “By 1874, the United States House of Representatives had gone Democratic.”
KLUGER, supra note 1, at 59. Although the end of Reconstruction did not immediately halt progress
toward equality for blacks, “around 1890, race relations in the South”—with the “relaxed
constraints”—began a “long downward spiral.” KLARMAN, supra note 43, at 10–11. “From roughly
1890 to 1910, neither Congress nor the Court displayed any significant sympathy for civil rights.”
Klarman, supra note 138, at 175.
139. 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 581 (1872).
140. The Court held that a criminal case “affects” only the party indicted and the government. See id.
at 591. Thus, the Court ruled, a victim and witnesses to an alleged crime who were excluded from testifying
against the defendant under a Kentucky statute because they were black could not bring suit in federal
court to challenge the state law under the Civil Rights Act of 1866, although the Act gave jurisdiction to
federal courts over causes “affecting” persons denied their civil rights. See id. at 591–92.
141. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). The parties in the case were not African American, which may
partially explain why the Slaughterhouse opinion contained rhetoric seemingly very helpful to African
Americans, describing, for example, how the Fourteenth Amendment protected them. See id. at 67–72.
142. 92 U.S. 214 (1875).
143. 92 U.S. 542 (1875).
144. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 71; see also ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S
UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 531 (1st ed. 1988) (describing Cruikshank as making federal
“prosecution of crimes committed against blacks virtually impossible” and giving “a green light to
acts of terror where local officials either could not or would not enforce the law”); Martha T.
McCluskey, Facing the Ghost of Cruikshank in Constitutional Law, 65 J. LEGAL EDUC. 278, 281
(2015) (asserting that Cruikshank “cleared the way for violent restoration of a white supremacist legal
order”); James Gray Pope, Snubbed Landmark: Why United States v. Cruikshank (1876) Belongs at
the Heart of the American Constitutional Canon, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 385, 388 (2014) (noting
that Cruikshank “first limited the Fourteenth Amendment to protect only against specifically
identified state violations, and not directly against private actions”).
145. See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 58; see also Ellen D. Katz, Reinforcing Representation:
Congressional Power to Enforce the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments in the Rehnquist and
Waite Courts, 101 MICH. L. REV. 2341, 2351 (2003) (“Reese and Cruikshank indisputably hindered
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The Court “continued the trend”146 with its decision in the Civil Rights
Cases147 of 1883 by ruling that restrictions in the Civil Rights Act of 1875
purporting to ban certain private misconduct against African Americans
exceeded Congress’s authority under the Thirteenth and Fourteenth
Amendments.148 In another 1883 decision, United States v. Harris,149 the
Court rejected federal criminal prosecutions of private persons for
lynching an African-American man, brought under provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1871, again on grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment
only authorized Congress to pass remedial legislation against state action,
not action by private persons.150 That same year, in Pace v. Alabama,151
the Court also rejected an equal protection challenge to an Alabama
statute that effectively branded blacks as inferior by punishing adultery
“more severely when committed between a white person and a black
person than when committed between two people of the same race.”152
When the Court during this era endorsed a Reconstruction right held
by African Americans, the protection was also narrowly limited or largely
unenforced. For example, in Strauder v. West Virginia,153 the Court, over
two dissents, ruled for an African-American criminal defendant by
striking down as a violation of equal protection a state statute that
explicitly excluded African Americans from juries.154 Also, in Neal v.
Delaware,155 the Court ruled for an African-American, criminal defendant

ongoing federal efforts to enforce the newly ratified Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.”).
146. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 53.
147. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
148. Id. at 24–32 (ruling that refusal of the private owner of an inn, a public conveyance, or a place
of public amusement to accommodate blacks did not impose “any badge of slavery or servitude” and,
thus, could not be prohibited by Congress based on its enforcement authority under those
amendments).
149. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
150. See id. at 638–41.
151. 106 U.S. 583 (1883).
152. Greene, supra note 9, at 412.
153. 100 U.S. 303 (1879).
154. See id. at 306. On the same day that it decided Strauder, the Court decided two related cases,
Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1879), and Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879). In Ex parte
Virginia, the Court upheld a federal statute that provided that no qualified person should be
disqualified based on race from jury service in any state or federal court and under which a state judge
was indicted for allegedly excluding black men from jury service based on race. See 100 U.S. at 348–
49. However, in Rives, the Court rejected an appeal from a black criminal defendant who claimed a
right to have at least one-third of his jury comprised of blacks. See id. at 322. The Court also indicated
in Rives, that, absent explicit discrimination in jury selection, such as that mandated by a state statute,
a criminal defendant had to litigate his juror-exclusion claim in state court before seeking relief in
federal court. See id. at 321–22.
155. 103 U.S. 370 (1881).
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who showed that no African American had ever been summoned for jury
service in the state, although the African-American population exceeded
twenty thousand by 1870 and comprised more than 17% of the state
population by 1880.156
Nonetheless, the Court limited the right “to cases involving black
parties,”157 and the Strauder opinion, “intentionally or not, almost invited
states” in selecting jurors “to rely on other criteria that might well have a
disparate impact on African Americans.”158 The Court declared that a
State could limit the selection of jurors “to males, to freeholders, to
citizens, to persons within certain ages, or to persons having educational
qualifications.”159 States used that advice “to circumvent the spirit of the
ruling through property, level of education, and other juror qualification
‘standards’ whose only real goal was racial discrimination.”160 When a
few African Americans made it to jury pools for trials, parties could also
use peremptory strikes to exclude them.161 With the Court avoiding any

156. See id. at 397–98.
157. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 71 n.148.
158. Sanford Levinson, Why Strauder v. West Virginia is the Most Important Single Source of Insight
on the Tensions Contained Within the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, 62 ST.
LOUIS U. L. REV. 603, 621 (2018).
Strauder and the companion cases offered “a gain, certainly, in rhetoric” for black persons. KLUGER,
supra note 1, at 63–64. Language in the Strauder opinion, for example, acknowledged that African
Americans suffered greatly from racial discrimination and that the Reconstruction Amendments aimed to
protect them. See, e.g., Strauder, 100 U.S. at 306 (asserting that the amendments aimed to secure “to a
race . . . that through many generations had been held in slavery, all the civil rights that the superior race
enjoy.”). The opinion also acknowledged the harm to blacks from the West Virginia law. See id. at 308
(“[P]ractically a brand upon them, affixed by law, an assertion of their inferiority, and a stimulant to that
race prejudice which is an impediment to securing . . . equal justice.”).
The Strauder ruling itself also effectively discounted various congressional statements during
promulgation of the Fourteenth Amendment asserting that the provision would protect only “civil” and
not “political” rights. See Levinson, supra note 158, at 610 (noting that jury service was a “paradigm
case[]” of a “political right[]” and that, during the debates in Congress, “several legislators took great care
to emphasize” that the Fourteenth Amendment covered only “civil,” not “political,” rights). Cf. Vikram
David Amar, Jury Service as Political Participation Akin to Voting, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 203, 241 (1995)
(contending that Strauder could have more easily rested on the Fifteenth Amendment).
For a view of the Fourteenth Amendment from that era that proclaimed it as applicable “to all persons
within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality,” see
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (applying the Equal Protection Clause in favor of laundry
owners who suffered discrimination by public officials because of their Chinese ancestry).
159. Strauder, 100 U.S. at 310.
160. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 73–74.
161. See DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 116 (1999) (noting that “the Court expressly condoned
race-based peremptory strikes as late as 1965”).
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further steps to enable African-American jury service for the next fifty
years, the practical effect of Strauder and Neal was minimal.162
The Court conspicuously abandoned the pretense of respect for the
equal value of African Americans in Plessy, a second case forming the
core of constitutional law’s anti-canon.163 Homer Plessy, a man with “oneeighth African blood” who appeared to be white,164 had tried to board a
whites-only train car in Louisiana in 1892.165 In the South, “the period
around 1890 marked a significant increase in the turn to legislatively
mandated segregation,”166 commonly called “Jim Crow” laws.167
Louisiana had passed a criminal statute that year that required separate
railway cars for whites and non-whites on intra-state passenger trains168
and that penalized with fines and imprisonment passengers who insisted
on going into cars to which they were not assigned.169 In response to his
prosecution, Plessy contended that the statute violated the Thirteenth and
Fourteenth Amendments.170 However, by a seven-to-one margin,171 the

162. The Court in Strauder “announced a broad principle of nondiscrimination,” but “left its
enforcement to state courts’.” Id. at 108; see also Benno C. Schmidt, Jr., Juries, Jurisdiction, and
Race Discrimination: The Lost Promise of Strauder v. West Virginia, 61 TEX. L. REV. 1401, 1485–
86 (1983) (speculating that the Court feared that pressing too hard would promote more private
vigilantism against blacks). In any event, “black jurors were nowhere to be found in many
jurisdictions, while the Court sitting atop the judicial pyramid did almost nothing until 1935. Amar,
The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 71–72 n.148. By propping up the façade of a race-neutral
criminal justice process that “imposed official violence on blacks,” the Court seemed mostly to
“contribute[] to the ‘normalization’ and institutionalization of subordination, rendering it even more
insidious and difficult to confront.” COLE, supra note 161, at 109.
163. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–52 (1896).
164. Id. at 541.
165. See Harris, supra note 51, at 204–05.
166. Cheryl I. Harris, In the Shadow of Plessy, 7 J. CONST. L. 867, 886 (2005)
167. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 7.
168. The Supreme Court previously had ruled, under the Commerce Clause, in Article I, Section 8 of the
Constitution, that states could not impose regulations on common carriers that imposed a direct burden on
interstate commerce. See Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U.S. 485 (1878) (striking down a Louisiana Reconstruction law
that mandated racial integration of passengers on common carrier traveling interstate).
169. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 540–41.
170. See id. at 541–42.
171. Justice David Brewer did not hear arguments or participate in the decision. See id. at 552.
Because of the death of his daughter, he left Washington, D.C., to go to his home in Kansas on the
day of the argument. See J. Gordon Hylton, The Justice Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice
David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 MISS. L.J. 315 (1991).
The lone dissenter, Justice John Marshall Harlan, see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 552, was the son of a
Kentucky slave-owner, and, according to a compelling, historical article, may have had a black halfbrother for whom he held affection, causing him vicariously to experience, as he put it, see id. at 562,
the segregation law’s “brand of servitude and degradation.” See James W. Gordon, Did the First
Justice Harlan Have a Black Brother?, 15 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 159, 234–36 (1993).
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Supreme Court upheld the law’s enforced separation of the races.172 The
decision marked the beginning of a half-century in which the Court
allowed states explicitly to command extensive segregation of
African Americans.173
Critics would be right to point out that Plessy was not the end of the
Court’s decisions authorizing states’ subjugation of African Americans.
Two years later, in Williams v. Mississippi,174 the Court upheld a
Mississippi scheme to effectively disenfranchise African Americans by
imposing, among other obstacles to voting, payment of a poll tax and
passage of a literacy test under which local officials would decide who
was literate.175 The following year, in Cumming v. Richmond County
Board of Education,176 a unanimous Court, through Justice Harlan, upheld
a local school board’s decision—purportedly based on resource scarcity—
to fund high school services for whites but not for African Americans.177
In the 1903 case of Giles v. Harris,178 Justice Holmes declared “political
rights” unenforceable through equitable relief under the Reconstruction
Amendments179 and declined to overturn provisions in Alabama’s
constitution and statutes that effectively disenfranchised African
Americans.180 Five years later, in Berea College v. Kentucky,181 the Court
surrendered further to state efforts to force whites to shun African
Americans by upholding a Kentucky law that prohibited the teaching of
white and African-American students at the same time and place, even by
a private college incorporated in the state.182
172. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 539.
173. See HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 87 (noting that for fifty years after 1900, “Jim Crow
laws proliferated in America”); id. at 115 (noting that Plessy “resulted in decades of blatant
segregation of blacks in public settings”).
174. 170 U.S. 213 (1898).
175. See id. at 220–25.
176. 175 U.S. 528 (1899).
177. See id. at 545 (asserting that “the education of people in schools maintained by state taxation
is a matter belonging to the respective [s]tates” and federal authority should rarely interfere).
178. 189 U.S. 475 (1903).
179. See Richard H. Pildes, Democracy, Anti-Democracy, and the Canon, 17 CONST. COMMENT.
295, 298 (2000) (“notwithstanding the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, Giles carves out from
them the category of ‘political rights’ and holds such rights unenforceable”).
180. See Giles, 189 U.S. at 488. Justice Holmes did allow that violation of such rights could be the
subject of a suit for money damages. See id. at 485. Two decades later, in Nixon v Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927), Justice Holmes also wrote the opinion for the Court allowing a suit for money damages against the
Texas Judges of Elections for denying a qualified African American man the opportunity to vote in a state
primary election based on a state statute barring blacks from participation. See id. at 540–41.
181. 211 U.S. 45 (1908).
182. See id. at 56–58.
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While Plessy was not the last of the Court’s decisions that greatly
injured African Americans, the Court’s conduct in that case earned its
special infamy.183 In addition to endorsing extensive, de jure segregation,
the Plessy opinion used white supremacist language to deride African
Americans as social beings.184 The degradation came with the effort to
explain why segregation on the railways would not deny African
Americans of property, in the form of social status, under the Fourteenth
Amendment.185 The Court said that African Americans were
“inferior . . . socially,”186 and, thus, the African American forced to sit
with African Americans suffered no injury: “if he be a colored man, and
be so assigned, he has been deprived of no property, since he is not
lawfully entitled to the reputation of being a white man.”187 Underscoring
its disrespect for African Americans, the Court noted that there could be
a denial of property to a white man if he were forced to sit in the nonwhites car: “[i]f he be a white man, and assigned to a colored coach, he
may have his action for damages against the company.”188 The differing
outcomes, again, found explanation in the endorsement of white
supremacy. African Americans purportedly were destined to remain lesser
social beings as part of the natural order: “[i]f one race be inferior to the
other socially, the constitution of the United States cannot put them upon
the same plane.”189
The Plessy opinion compounded the insult that African Americans
were natively “inferior” by simultaneously denying “that the enforced
separation of the two races stamp[ed] the colored race with a badge of
inferiority.”190 According to the Court, “[i]f this be so, it is not by reason
of anything found in the act, but solely because the colored race chooses
to put that construction upon it.”191 But, if segregation was not a stamp of
inferiority, why had the Court itself asserted that “colored” people were
“inferior?” And why would a white man forced to sit in a railway car with
African Americans have a cause of action, according to the Court, for
denigration of his status? The discordant assertions suggested not simply
183. See, e.g., GATES, supra note 16, at 34 (calling Plessy “the most notorious example of the
Supreme Court restricting civil rights”).
184. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 549–52 (1896).
185. See id. at 548–49.
186. Id. at 552.
187. Id. at 549; see also WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 93 (explaining why the Jim Crow laws
implied that all African Americans were inferior to all whites).
188. Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549.
189. Id. at 552; see also id. at 551 (asserting the absence of “natural affinities” between the races).
190. Id. at 551.
191. Id.
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“self-induced blindness”192 but judicial dishonesty about the social
meaning of the Louisiana law.193 “Segregation in the South [came] down
in apostolic succession from slavery and the Dred Scott case,” and was
“set up and continued for the very purpose of keeping” African Americans
“in an inferior station.”194 It was “an instrument of subordination . . . to
any honest observer.”195 The Court appeared to be bald-faced lying. And,
if the Court was lying on that score, wasn’t the message that it would also
prevaricate when states provided lesser benefits or protections to the
segregated African Americans?
The harm of Plessy for African Americans was incalculable,196 as the
decision enabled states to publicly denigrate them through pervasive
demands of separation197 and to give them lesser accommodations and
services.198 Indeed, for decades, “government programs and societal
practices openly excluded African Americans from economic and
educational opportunities.”199 The message of inferiority fueled by Plessy
also negatively affected the perception of many African Americans
192. See Black, supra note 3, at 426; id. at 422 n.8 (asserting in regard to the Court’s claim that
any “badge of inferiority” was only in the minds of black people: “[t]he curves of callousness and
stupidity intersect at their respective maxima”).
193. Why, also, was it permitted, as Justice Harlan noted in dissent, see Plessy, 163 U.S. at 553
(Harlan, J., dissenting), for a white person to have an African-American nanny in the whites-only car,
unless it was because the “social meaning” of her presence as a “subordinate” was clear? See Amar,
Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 85.
194. See Black, supra note 3, at 424.
195. Amar, The Supreme Court, supra note 46, at 65.
196. See, e.g., FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 47, at 471 (“The effect of this whole experience upon
African Americans cannot be fully measured or even appreciated.”). See also HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note
1, at 85–116 (detailing the many ways in which legally legitimized segregation harmed African Americans).
197. “By linking racial separation on trains with that in education,” the Plessy decision also placed
“the Court’s imprimatur on a considerably expanded field in which segregation was justified.” Pratt,
supra note 2, at 739. And after Plessy, pervasive, judicially-endorsed segregation in the South
“became in very short time a reality.” WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 84.
198. The Court later began to reject states’ schemes to provide lesser benefits to blacks. In Missouri
ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938), the victim, Lloyd Gaines, challenged his denial by the
University of Missouri to its whites-only law school and its failure to provide a law school for African
Americans. The Court affirmed Plessy to the extent of not requiring Missouri to admit Gaines to its
law school but also ruled that the state must fund a law school for African Americans that was similar
to the one provided for whites rather than merely paying for African Americans to attend an out-ofstate law school to which they might gain admission. See id. at 351. However, Gaines never realized
the benefit. “On March 19, 1939, several months after the decision, but prior to his enrollment in law
school, Gaines suddenly disappeared—one afternoon, Gaines left the fraternity house where he
resided to buy some stamps, and he was never seen again.” HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 112
(footnotes omitted). “Many believe that Gaines paid the ultimate sacrifice, giving his life to bridge
the racial divide.” Id.
199. HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 115.
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regarding their own self-worth, and that kind of psychic damage could
begin early in childhood.200 Perhaps most appalling, the judicially
approved segregation supported by the Court’s official reiteration that
African Americans were inferior encouraged their violent treatment at the
hands of white persons.201 Plessy was, in effect, permission from the Court
for white people to be virulent racists, which helped “fear, jealously,
proscription, hatred, and fanaticism”202 by whites toward African
Americans to reach largely unrestrained expression.203
Decades later, Gunnar Myrdal, a Swedish sociologist—and, later,
Nobel Prize winning economist—famously chronicled204 the horror of
private violence and governmental indifference (and more) that had
befallen many African Americans in Plessy’s Jim Crow South.205 Racial
violence against African Americans, acquiesced in or promoted by
government, was also widespread in northern states, particularly to
prevent residential integration.206 Yet the pervasive and brutal nature of
racial violence was especially noteworthy in the former slave states.
200. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 1, at 421 (quoting testimony in the Brown case of Professor
Louisa Pinkham Holt on the often-negative effects of legally enforced racial segregation on the sense
of self-worth and potential for achievement of the victims). See also Catherine MacKinnon,
MacKinnon, J., Concurring in the Judgment, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD
HAVE SAID 143, 146–47 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (contending that the “authoritative relegation of
equals to a social status of inferiority . . . is always harmful,” and “the injury . . . lies not in the
children’s response to the state practice but in the practice itself”).
201. See WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 93–94 (asserting that the Jim Crow laws “gave free rein and the
majesty of law to mass aggressions that might otherwise have been curbed, blunted or deflected” and made
Southern whites increasingly more combative and violent in their dealings with African Americans).
202. Id. at 51.
203. See, e.g., KLUGER, supra note 1, at 84 (“The toxins of racism flourished as never before
throughout America during the first fifteen years of the twentieth century.”).
Did the Supreme Court begin to turn the page with its anti-peonage decisions that rejected statutes
rendering persons who breached employment contracts indentured servants? See United States v.
Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133 (1914); Bailey v. Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911). For the view that those
decisions represented one of the Court’s “greatest achievements” as “a contribution to justice for
black people,” see Alexander Bickel & Benno C. Schmidt Jr., The Judiciary and Responsible
Government: 1910–1921, 820, in 9 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES DEVISE, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES (1984). For the view that those decisions were ineffective in stopping
peonage and of minimal importance for African Americans, see Randall Kennedy, Race Relations
Law and the Tradition of Celebration: The Case of Professor Schmidt, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 1622,
1646–48 (1986).
204. Although on a different point, in Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), the
Supreme Court cited Myrdal’s work. See id. at 494 n.11.
205. See generally 2 GUNNAR MYRDAL, AN AMERICAN DILEMMA: THE NEGRO PROBLEM AND
MODERN DEMOCRACY (1944).
206. See RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW 143 (2017) (“During much of the twentieth
century, police tolerance and promotion of cross-burnings, vandalism, arson, and other violent acts to
maintain residential segregation was systematic and nationwide.”).
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Myrdal reported, “Any white man can strike or beat a Negro, steal or
destroy his property, cheat him in a transaction and even take his life,
without much fear of legal reprisal.”207 Myrdal reported that the “minor
forms of violence—cheating and striking”—were “a matter of everyday
occurrence.”208 African Americans in the South often depended
economically upon whites and had to interact with them.209 Thus, they
were forced through self-abasement before whites to try “to avoid
situations in which such violence [was] likely to occur.”210 When African
Americans invoked the displeasure of a white man, they also generally
bore the humiliation of responding obsequiously to his “command[s]
[and] threat[s],” hoping to avoid physical harm.211 At the same time,
“accidental insult, and sometimes nothing at all except the general
insecurity or sadism of certain whites, [could] serve as occasion
for violence.”212
While the white man in the South was generally secure in the Jim Crow
era against allegations from an African American, Southern courts
discriminated harshly against African Americans alleged to have
mistreated or responded with violence toward a white person.213 The lives
of African Americans often did not matter much to white prosecutors,
judges, and juries.214 That is not to say that African-American defendants
were always treated unfairly. If the victim was another African American,
the criminal justice system might give the African-American defendant
only a modest reprove. Accordingly, “[a]s long as only Negroes [were]
concerned and no whites [were] disturbed, great leniency [would] be
shown in most cases.”215 Although “white Southerners” thought this was
“evidence of the friendliness of Southern courts toward Negroes,” the
“Southern Negro community [was] not at all happy about [the] double
standard,” because it was “actually a form of discrimination” that left
African-American communities vulnerable to crime.216 Indeed, both raceof-complainant and race-of-defendant discrimination operated and at
207. See MYRDAL, supra note 205, at 559.
208. Id.
209. See id.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
213. See id. at 553.
214. See id. at 551–53 (noting the disregard shown for the just treatment of African Americans
accused of crimes against whites).
215. Id. at 551.
216. Id.
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times synergistically. When an African American was alleged to have
committed a crime against a white person, particularly a serious offense,
there was little possibility for fair adjudication or leniency.217 And, “[i]n
the case of a threatened lynching, the court[s made] no pretense at justice;
the Negro [had to] be condemned, and usually condemned to death, before
the crowd [got] him.”218
During Jim Crow, not only the threat of lynching but lynching itself
was a regular and widely-used form of violence against African-American
communities and their supporters.219 A lynching did not require that the
African-American victim commit a crime; a slight insult or even an
erroneous accusation of disrespect toward a white person could be
enough.220 The number of lynchings had already begun accelerating from
the time of the Civil Rights Cases221 through the early 1890s.222 “By 1892,
lynchings had climbed to an unofficial [annual] figure of 231, the most
ever in a single year.”223 While that was the annual peak in documented
cases, Southern lynchings in the decades after Plessy became even more
“a tool of racial control that terrorized and targeted African
Americans.”224 “The ratio of black lynching victims to white lynching
victims was 4 to 1 from 1882 to 1889; increased to more than 6 to 1
between 1890 to 1900; and soared to more than 17 to 1 after 1900.”225 As
217. See id. at 551–53.
218. Id. at 553.
219. In America, lynching emerged in the Western frontier in the early 1800s as vigilante justice
that did not necessarily mean killing, although by the 1830s, “lynching became synonymous with
hanging.” EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 27. Although
lynching was used into the late 1800s as a form of vigilante “punishment” not only for blacks but also
“for whites, Mexican, Chinese, and Native Americans,” it later took on “a distinctly black/white
character.” Ogletree, supra note 20, at 58. By the 1900s, “lynching had come almost exclusively to
mean the summary execution of Southern black men.” PHILLIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS
UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF BLACK AMERICA 18 (2003).
The greatest crusader against lynching in the Jim Crow era was an African American woman, Ida
B. Wells. See CONE, supra note 16, at 126–33 (recounting Wells’s campaign). For a compilation of
Wells’s most important writings on the subject, see IDA B. WELLS-BARNETT, ON LYNCHINGS (Dover
ed. 2014) (1892).
220. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 29 (“African Americans
frequently were lynched for non-criminal violations of social customs or racial expectations, such as
speaking to white people with less respect or formality than observers believed was due.”).
221. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
222. See KLUGER, supra note 1, at 68.
223. Id.
224. EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 27; see also STEWART
E. TOLNAY & E. M. BECK, A FESTIVAL OF VIOLENCE: AN ANALYSIS OF SOUTHERN LYNCHINGS,
1882–1930, at 17 (1992) (asserting that lynching increasingly became a “routine and systematic effort
to subjugate the African American minority”).
225. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 27.
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Jim Crow hardened in place, “[t]he character of the violence also
changed,” with “gruesome public spectacle lynchings” involving
“prolonged torture, mutilation, dismemberment, and burning at the stake,”
becoming “much more common.”226 Between the end of Reconstruction
and 1950, white mobs carried out approximately 4,400 documented,
racial-hatred lynchings,227 almost all in the former slave states in which
Plessy-approved segregation held sway.228
II.

THE SUPREME COURT’S FAILURE TO ATONE

Has the Supreme Court adequately pursued redemption for its
complicity in the reign of racial hatred that engulfed much of the United
States for decades and impeded the journey of African Americans from
slavery toward equality? The Court has failed decisively to pursue
expiation according to the standards that this Article proposes.229 The
Court has played a valuable role in the movement to end de jure
segregation, and it has otherwise taken numerous steps in the modern era
to help shield racial minorities somewhat from unjust discriminations.230
However, as a body, the Court has eschewed rationales for its rulings
protecting racial minorities that fully expose the institution’s past
226. Id. at 28, 50; see also MANFRED BERG, POPULAR JUSTICE: A HISTORY OF LYNCHING IN
AMERICA 94 (2011) (noting that these sadistic tortures of the victim were often festive events for the
white crowd in observance).
227. In United States v. Shipp, 214 U.S. 386 (1909), the Supreme Court expressed its irritation
over a lynching that rendered moot the Court’s allowance of an appeal to review the criminal
conviction and death sentence of an African-American defendant, one Ed Johnson. After the Court
allowed the appeal, Shipp, the local sheriff in Chattanooga, Tennessee, who held Johnson in custody
and who was aware of the Court’s action, aided and abetted a mob who took Johnson from the jail
and lynched him. See id. at 423. The Court ordered Shipp, among others, to be tried for contempt. In
the first trial in the Supreme Court’s history, Shipp was found guilty, and the Court subsequently
upheld the conviction. See id. at 425. However, for his crime, the justices ordered Shipp to serve only
ninety days in the District of Columbia jail. See Mark Curriden, A Supreme Case of Contempt,
ABAJ. (June 2, 2009, 4:50 AM) https://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/a_supreme_case_of_
contempt [https://perma.cc/VVQ2-4Y4J].
Shipp was also released early, and returning to Chattanooga by train, “was greeted with a hero’s
welcome by more than 10,000 cheering supporters. Later, a monument was erected in his honor.” Id.
228. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 4 (documenting
4,084 such lynchings in twelve Southern states and more than 300 in other states).
229. See supra text accompanying note 15; see also DYSON, supra note 15, at 78–80, 197 (arguing
for recognition that separate-but-equal policy produced enduring inequality for which there should be
acceptance of responsibility and reparation).
230. See infra notes 234–287 and accompanying text. See also Jack M. Balkin, Brown v. Board of
Education; A Critical Introduction, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID
1, 24–25 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001) (contending that the Brown decision had an important, positive
influence in promoting civil rights and racial equality).
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collaborations with the forces seeking to ensure perpetual, white
supremacy.231 And the Court, as a body, has never provided an
institutional apology for its conduct in Dred Scott and Plessy.232 In his
dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan hinted that a duty to “atone” would
eventually be the price of the Court’s actions that day, which he accurately
predicted would rival in infamy the Court’s conduct in Dred Scott.233 If
the Court aims for true atonement and the maximum it can inspire in racial
reconciliation, there is reason to doubt that it has adequately reckoned
with that call to conscience.
A.

Brown and its Aftermath in the 1950s

The Court did not atone in Brown v. Board of Education.234 Despite the
iconic and beloved status of that decision among those who believe in the
“Great Progressive Narrative” of our Constitution,235 the holding and
rationale of the Brown opinion were narrowly limited.236 The Court
declared de jure segregation unconstitutional for public primary and
231. See infra notes 234–287 and accompanying text.
232. Individual justices or groups of justices constituting less than a Court majority have at times
hinted at their embarrassment over Dred Scott or Plessy. See, e.g., Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (noting that, in Plessy, “this Court endorse[d] the
oppressive practice of race segregation” and that “[n]ot until Loving v. Virgina, 388 U.S. 1
(1967) . . . could one say with security that the Constitution and this Court would abide no measure
‘designed to maintain White Supremacy’”); Bd. of Educ. of Oklahoma City Public Sch. v. Dowell,
498 U.S. 237, 257 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (referring to the “ugly legacy” of Plessy); Metro
Broadcasting, Inc. v. F.C.C., 497 U.S. 547, 631 (1990) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“The fundamental
errors in Plessy, its standard of review and its validation of rank racial insult by the State, distorted
the law for six decades . . . .”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 344 (1987) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (“we have sought to free ourselves from the burden of this history”).
233. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 562 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The thin disguise of ‘equal’
accommodations for passengers in railroad coaches will not mislead any one, nor atone for the wrong
this day done.”); id. at 559 (“In my opinion, the judgment this day rendered will, in time, prove to be
quite as pernicious as the decision made by this tribunal in the Dred Scott Case.”).
234. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
235. See Balkin, supra note 229, at 3–5 (asserting that “Brown has become a beloved legal and
political icon,” in part because the ruling comports with the “Great Progressive Narrative”). But see
Gerald N. Rosenberg, African-American Rights After Brown, in BLACK, WHITE AND BROWN 203,
208–33 (2004) (expressing doubts that Brown had significant impact on school desegregation or the
civil rights movement). See also KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 7 (arguing for “a middle
ground” between the views at one extreme that Brown “created the civil rights movement and at the
other that it had no impact whatsoever”).
236. For a more transparent and institutionally self-reflective version of what at least a concurring
opinion in Brown might have said, see Drew S. Days III, Days, J., Concurring, in WHAT BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID 92–99 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
For a forceful and insightful version of what a dissenting opinion in Brown might have said, see
Derrick Bell, Bell, J., Dissenting, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID
185–200 (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).

10 Howe.docx (Do Not Delete)

768

5/30/20 11:47 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 95:737

secondary schools as a carve-out from Plessy’s “separate but equal”
doctrine.237 This declaration did not include a renunciation of the Court’s
position in Dred Scott and Plessy that African Americans were naturally
“inferior.”238 The Brown Court asserted simply that public education had
become much more important to personal and civic development since
Plessy and that “modern” psychological authority, unavailable when
Plessy was decided, showed that legally-segregated schools tended to
retard the development of black children by generating in them a feeling
of inferiority.239 There was no explicit rejection even of the Plessy Court’s
fabrication about the neutrality of Jim Crow laws generally.240 One could
read Brown without surmising that the Court experienced institutional
shame for anything said or done in Plessy.241
In the immediate aftermath of Brown, the Court also offered no
institutional apology for its past conduct. Bolling v. Sharpe,242 a
companion case to Brown, saw the Court extend Brown’s equal protection
ruling to the District of Columbia schools through the Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause without mention of Plessy or much elaboration.243 In
Brown II,244 which focused on remedy, the Court also did not mention
Plessy and, as for the future, softened Brown, by allowing localities to
proceed with school desegregation with “all deliberate speed,” meaning
gradually.245 The Court extended Brown to public graduate and
professional schools in a terse opinion in 1956 that called for immediate
action but that also made no mention of Plessy.246 The Court’s extension
of Brown to other kinds of public accommodations in the 1950s came
237. The Court posed the question presented as “whether Plessy v. Ferguson should be held
inapplicable to public education.” Brown, 347 U.S. at 492. The Court articulated its ruling as follows:
“[w]e conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of ‘separate but equal’ has no place.
Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.” Id. at 495.
238. See supra notes 122–124 & 190 and accompanying text (quoting Dred Scott and Plessy).
239. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 492–95.
240. An implicit and oblique rejection of the Plessy Court’s fabrication, see supra notes 191–193
and accompanying text, arguably appeared in the Brown Court’s citation to authorities indicating that
legally-enforced segregation outside of the public-school context also could negatively affect the selfperceptions of African Americans. See Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 n.11.
241. See STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 91 (describing the Brown opinion as having
“whitewashed the long-standing connections between chattel slavery, white supremacist ideology,
and state segregation of schools”).
242. 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
243. See id. at 499–500.
244. See Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
245. Id. at 301. See also CHARLES J. OGLETREE, ALL DELIBERATE SPEED 125 (2004) (“Brown
II . . . signaled that southern school boards could move gradually . . . .”).
246. See Florida ex rel. Hawkins v. Bd. of Control, 350 U.S. 413, 414 (1956) (per curiam).
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through several orders merely affirming lower court decisions, in none of
which the Court offered any institutional repentance for its own past
complicity in the nightmare of de jure segregation.247
B.

The 1960s Through the Mid-1970s

In decisions from the 1960s and 1970s, the Court also expressed no
institutional contrition. Even when rejecting some of the postReconstruction precedents that helped subjugate African Americans,248
the Warren Court offered no apologies for the past. For example, in
Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections,249 the Court, over three dissents,250
rejected a state law that imposed as a prerequisite to voting in state
elections a poll tax of $1.50 that Harper, an African-American woman,
could not pay.251 The ruling partially undermined the Williams decision
that came two years after Plessy.252 Justice Douglas, for the majority, at
least mentioned Plessy and noted that its declarations of what constituted
equal or unequal treatment “sound strange to a contemporary ear.”253
However, he offered no further indication of institutional shame.254 The
247. See, e.g., New Orleans City Park Improvement Ass’n. v. Detiege, 252 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1958)
(public parks), aff’d per curiam, 358 U.S. 54 (1958); 142 F. Supp. 707 (M.D. Ala. 1956) (public
transportation), aff’d per curiam, Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. Atlanta, 223
F.2d 93 (5th Cir. 1955) (public golf courses), rev’d, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor & City Council of
Baltimore v. Dawson, 220 F.2d 386 (4th Cir. 1955) (public beaches), aff’d 350 U.S. 877 (1955).
248. The Court has not overruled all of those old rulings. For example, the modern Court has
reaffirmed its ruling in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883), that section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment does not give Congress power to regulate private parties. See United States v. Morrison,
529 U.S. 598, 620–23 (2000). That ruling remains harmful because it means that, “[i]f states fail to
enforce their laws to protect certain groups, federal legislation offering alternative remedies” to try to
enforce the Equal Protection Clause will be hampered to the extent that the private conduct cannot be
regulated under the Commerce Clause. Kermit Roosevelt, III, Bait and Switch: Why United States v.
Morrison is Wrong About Section 5, 100 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 623 (2015).
249. 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
250. See id. at 670 (Black, J., dissenting); id. at 680 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
251. See id. at 664 n.1. Harper’s claim was based on the Equal Protection Clause. The TwentyFourth Amendment, ratified in 1964, had made poll taxes unconstitutional in federal elections, but
not state elections. See U.S. CONST. amend. XXIV.
252. For discussion of Williams, see supra text at notes 174–175.
The Harper Court actually rejected a more recent precedent. In Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277
(1937), the Court had reaffirmed that states could impose poll taxes as a condition of voting. See id.
at 283–84. The Harper Court said that it overruled Breedlove on that score, without reference to the
1898 Williams decision. See Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
253. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669.
254. Justice Douglas several times conveyed a more insightful and irreverent view of judicial and
legislative history in civil rights cases when he was not writing for the Court majority. See, e.g., Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 444–49 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring); Bell v. Maryland,
378 U.S. 226, 242–85 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States,
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stated reason for abandoning precedent was antiseptic: “[n]otions of what
constitutes equal treatment for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause do
change.”255In other 1960s cases overruling Plessy-era precedents, the
Court did no better in atoning. For example, in Loving v. Virginia,256 the
Court struck down long-standing Virginia statutes that criminalized, as to
both parties, any marriage between a “white person” and a “colored
person.”257 Through Chief Justice Warren, the Court at least conveyed that
the racial classification embodied in the miscegenation laws involved
“invidious” discrimination that were designed to maintain “White
Supremacy.”258 Warren also openly rejected Virginia’s claim that the
Pace decision, from 1883,259 supported the state’s “equal application”
theory that the law was proper because it punished both parties equally.260
Of course, that was similar to a theory that the Court had later used in
Plessy to support de jure segregation.261 However, Warren simply noted
that the reasoning in Pace had not “withstood analysis in the subsequent
decisions of this Court.”262 And as for Plessy, there was no mention of it,
let alone any expression of institutional remorse.263
There is also nothing close to an apology from the Court in its primary
and secondary school desegregation decisions from the 1960s and
1970s.264 In several of those cases, the Court affirmed remedies for past
constitutional violations in the form of legally-enforced segregation.265
Those cases presented precisely the kinds of segregation that the Plessy

379 U.S. 241, 279–91 (1964) (Douglas, J., concurring).
255. Harper, 383 U.S. at 669 (emphasis added).
256. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
257. See id. at 4–6 (describing the statutes and noting that they dated to Virginia’s “Racial Integrity
Act” of 1924).
258. Id.; id. at 11–12.
259. For more on Pace, see supra notes 151–152.
260. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 10.
261. See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 (1896) (asserting that there was not “anything found in
the act” mandating separation of the races that “stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority”).
262. Loving, 388 U.S. at 10 (quoting McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184, 188 (1964)).
263. For a history of Fifteenth Amendment litigation that begins with states’ efforts to
disenfranchise African Americans voters in the 1800s but omits the Court’s complicit decisions and
selectively mentions rulings that aimed to be more helpful to African American citizens, see Chief
Justice Warren’s majority opinion in South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 310–11 (1966).
264. In some such cases, the Court rejected desegregation remedies imposed by lower courts,
because the remedies were deemed to exceed the extent of the violations. See Dayton Bd. of Educ. v.
Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 413–18 (1977); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 737–53 (1974).
265. See Green v. Cty. Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971); McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U.S. 39 (1971).
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opinion had approved in dicta,266 and, thus, those cases presented relevant
vehicles for pursuing judicial expiation. However, the Court did not
express contrition.
C.

The Late 1970s and Beyond

The Court’s opinions from the late 1970s and beyond also lack in
efforts at purgation for the Court’s past degradation of African Americans.
The “affirmative action” cases do not meet the standard. The Court has
agreed that Congress can, within limits, “identify and redress the effects
of society-wide discrimination.”267 The Court also has declared that “a
state or local subdivision (if delegated the authority from the State) has
the authority to eradicate the effects of private discrimination within its
own legislative jurisdiction,” subject to “strict scrutiny.”268 In the sphere
of higher education, the Court also has held that states can use narrowlytailored racial preferences in admissions to pursue diversity-associated
goals.269 However, one searching through those opinions for anything
approaching a confession and apology by the Court for Dred Scott and
Plessy will come up empty-handed.
The Court at times seems to have consciously avoided acknowledging
the violence, its own complicity, or any duty to atone. Consider Coker v.
Georgia,270 a 1977 decision in which the Court held that the death penalty
for the rape of an adult was cruel and unusual.271 From 1930, when
national statistics began being compiled, to 1972, when the Court

266. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 544 (asserting that segregated schools for children had long been the
norm almost universally).
267. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 490 (1989) (reiterating Congress’s power
to identify and redress discrimination under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment, but ruling that
states are restricted from doing so under section one of that Amendment); see also Fullilove v.
Klutznick, 448 U.S. 448 (1980) (plurality opinion) (upholding a 10% set-aside for minority business
enterprises, contained in a federal public works employment act against a challenge based on the
equal protection demands of the Due Process Clause).
268. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. at 491–92, 493.
269. See Fisher v. Univ. of Texas, 579 U.S. __, 136 S. Ct. 2198, 2207–15 (2016) (upholding
narrowly-tailored use, as determined non-deferentially by the judiciary, of racial preferences for
minority applicants to secure the educational benefits of student diversity); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539
U.S. 306, 343 (2003) (upholding narrowly-tailored use of racial preferences in admissions by the
University of Michigan Law School to obtain the educational benefits of a diverse student body); cf.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 320 (1978) (striking down racially-based setaside program of admissions by state medical school but holding that a state “has a substantial interest
that legitimately may be served by a properly devised admissions program involving the competitive
consideration of race and ethnic origin”).
270. 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (plurality opinion).
271. See id. at 598–600.
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invalidated standard-less capital sentencing in Furman v. Georgia,272
89%, or 405, of the 455 men executed for rape were African American,
and “virtually all . . . were accused of raping white women.”273 Also, it
seems that “no white man has ever been executed for raping a black
victim.”274 Those statistics almost certainly help explain why the Court,
in Coker, declared the death penalty disproportionate punishment for the
rape of an adult victim.275 However, the Court avoided discussing the
racial bias problem or any hint of the past judicially legitimized
degradation of African Americans.276 In a context involving the
discriminatory use of extraordinary state violence against African
Americans, the Court eschewed a rationale that it could have used to atone
for its complicity in the long and violent campaign for white supremacy.277
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,278 concerning whether to overrule
precedent in the abortion context, a five-justice majority asserted that “we
think Plessy was wrong the day it was decided,”279 but did not go much
further in its criticism. Indeed, the larger point of those justices was that
the “facts” arguably had changed between Plessy and Brown, unlike in the
abortion context.280 Those justices wanted to underscore that, if members
of the Plessy Court, they would have found the legislatively mandated
segregation to be a “badge of inferiority” and “inherently unequal.”281
That concession was commendable. At the same time, they implied that
reasonable people could have disagreed: “[s]ociety’s understanding of the
facts [was] . . . fundamentally different from the basis claimed for the
decision in 1896.”282 Such qualified disagreement with Plessy can hardly
count as a confession and apology.
Perhaps the Court’s best effort at institutional contrition for the insult
and injury of Plessy (or Dred Scott) to African Americans and their

272. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
273. Sheri Lynn Johnson, Coker v. Georgia: Of Rape, Race, and Burying the Past, in DEATH
PENALTY STORIES 171, 193 (John H. Blume & Jordan M. Steiker eds., 2009).
274. Id.
275. See Coker, 433 U.S. at 597, 600; Steiker & Steiker, supra note 11, at 97 (concluding that
“Coker represents the height of the Court’s avoidance of race”).
276. See Johnson, supra note 273, at 179–83.
277. For an outline of the constitutional rationale that the Court could have employed, see infra
Parts V and VI.
278. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
279. Id. at 863 (O’Connor, Kennedy, & Souter, J., joined by Blackmun & Stevens, J.).
280. See id. at 864.
281. Id. at 862–63.
282. Id. at 863.
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supporters came in Bob Jones University v. United States.283 There, the
Court held that nonprofit, private schools and universities that enforce
racially discriminatory admissions standards based on religious grounds
do not qualify as tax-exempt organizations under the Internal Revenue
Code and that contributions to such institutions are not deductible as
charitable contributions.284 The opinion contained several sentences
denouncing racial discrimination and implicitly criticizing Plessy and,
perhaps, Dred Scott. At one point, the Court asserted, “[g]iven the stress
and anguish of the history of efforts to escape from the shackles of the
‘separate but equal’ doctrine of Plessy v. Ferguson, . . . it cannot be said
that educational institutions that, for whatever reasons, practice racial
discrimination, are institutions exercising ‘beneficial and stabilizing
influences in community life.’”285 At another point, the Court proclaimed
that “Government has a fundamental, overriding interest in eradicating
racial discrimination in education—discrimination that prevailed, with
official approval, for the first 165 years of the Nation’s constitutional
history.”286 Those statements aim to heal. Yet they do not qualify as a
confession and apology. No effort can come close if it does not
acknowledge in some detail the degrading consequences of Jim Crow,
including the physical and psychic violence that was inflicted on
African Americans.287
III. OVERCOMING POSSIBLE OBJECTIONS TO ATONEMENT
Given the Court’s failure thus far to explicitly atone institutionally for
Dred Scott and Plessy, should it now do so? This Article argues that it
should and proposes robust atonement that would include transparent
confession of the wrongs done, acknowledgment of the associated
damages inflicted, apology for the transgressions and injuries, and a
relevant ruling to underscore sincerity. Following that course would signal
that the Court believes enough in equal justice for African Americans and
the nation’s ability to achieve it to reject lingering concern with treading
lightly so as not to inflame opposing forces. The message could also invite
a shared recognition—and a “shared anger and grief”288—regarding the
brutally improper treatment of a large segment of our people. Given the
Court’s participation in the subjugation of African Americans for
283. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
284. See id. at 604–05.
285. Id. at 595 (internal citations omitted).
286. Id. at 604 (footnote omitted).
287. See supra notes 200–208 and accompanying text.
288. Kim, supra note 18, at 500.
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decades,289 that seems like a worthy effort. Nonetheless, to further
examine the utility and feasibility of the endeavor, this Part considers
some possible general objections.290
A.

The Argument that the Rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy Were Not
Wrong When Rendered

Could one argue that the Court was not wrong in its holdings in Dred
Scott and Plessy when they were rendered and, thus, that there is little
reason to apologize?291 The underlying explanation would center on the
notion that the Constitution did not give clear answers in Dred Scott and
Plessy. An approach to constitutional construction other than originalism
would have to underlie such an objection. Virtually no serious scholars
now publicly contend that the original Constitution or the Reconstruction
Amendments required the rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy.292 Indeed, to
try to save originalism as an interpretive approach, some of its leading
proponents have attempted to explain why, instead, Brown v. Board of
Education was required as a matter of original meaning.293 “It is often said
that no theory of constitutional interpretation is sound if it cannot explain
and justify” the Brown decision.294 But originalism contemplates a
Constitution with many fixed meanings and that a ruling justified on
original meaning does not become unjustified absent changed facts or a
constitutional amendment.295
289. See supra Parts II & III.
290. This Part does not aim to address all possible general objections but rather some central ones
as to which answers can best help elucidate the rationales and value of confession and apology.
291. Cf., e.g., GRABER, supra note 43, at 28 (“Taney’s constitutional claims in Dred Scott were
well within the mainstream of antebellum constitutional thought.”); CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE
PLESSY CASE 197–98 (1987) (asserting that the conclusions in the majority opinion in Plessy, from
the standpoint of the 1890s, “did not rest on bad logic, bad social science, bad history or bad
constitutional law” and “did not lack substantial support in contemporary expert opinion”).
292. But cf. JERROLD M. PACKARD, AMERICAN NIGHTMARE 75–76 (2002) (“The [Plessy] decision,
in fact seemed to have been precisely what the framers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended when
they so cautiously wrote it three decades earlier.”).
293. See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA 82–83 (1990) (asserting that Brown
should have been written “in terms of the original understanding” of the view that “equality, not
separation was written into the text,” and “equality and segregation were mutually inconsistent,
though the ratifiers did not understand that”); Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and the
Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. L. REV. 947, 954–55 (1995) (arguing, based on historical research
focusing on votes and speeches by Congressional actors in the aftermath of passage of the Fourteenth
Amendment, that, as a matter of originalism, Plessy was wrong and Brown was right).
294. Jack M. Balkin, Preface, in WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD HAVE SAID ix,
x–xi (Jack M. Balkin ed., 2001).
295. See Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV.
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Therefore, if Brown were actually correct as a matter of original
meaning, Plessy would have been wrong under that interpretive theory.296
That means an attempted demurrer that would cover both Dred Scott and
Plessy would have to rest, instead, on the idea that the Constitution often
does not give fixed, determinate answers and did not in those cases.297 On
that view, the argument would go, the Dred Scott rulings could have been
plausibly correct when rendered although the Reconstruction
Amendments soon overruled them. And, as for Plessy, the argument
would go, the ruling could have been plausibly correct when rendered but
deemed clearly wrong today, although neither the relevant facts nor the
relevant Constitutional language changed in the interim.
The grounds to reject such a demurrer trace back to why Dred Scott
and Plessy are the heart of constitutional law’s anti-canon—“the most
important constitutional texts that we, the retrospective constructors of
constitutional history, regard as normatively repulsive.”298 In the modern
era, we have decided that it was unreasonable to say the things the Court
said in those cases even when the Court said them.299 Although
pronounced white hegemony prevailed in this country in those eras,300 we
think the Court should have risen above forces that we understand as
depraved, given that the Constitution gave the Court that authority. The
Court’s function was not to enable a racial hierarchy through a delusion
that black people were inferior and, thus, that there was no constitutional
problem with their subjugation by force. By conforming to the widespread
inhumanity of a maladapted society, the Court itself acted not reasonably,
but wrongfully.301
453, 456 (2013) (noting that the “two core ideas” of originalism are that “the original meaning . . . of
the constitutional text is fixed at the time each provision is framed and ratified” and that
“constitutional actors . . . ought to be constrained by the original meaning”).
296. See McConnell, supra note 293, at 954–55 (contending that only one of the two could have
been correct as a matter of original meaning).
297. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 43, at 17 (asserting that constitutional law did not generate any
clearly correct answers in Dred Scott); KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 47 (asserting that in
four areas of black subjugation during the Plessy era—“segregation, disenfranchisement, black jury
service, and separate-and-unequal education—traditional sources of constitutional law were
sufficiently indeterminate to accommodate white supremacists preferences”).
298. Primus, supra note 9, at 254, n.41 (noting also that “the canon and the anti-canon are mutually
constructing,” which suggests that rejection by a canonical text also may be part of what lands certain
texts within the anti-canon).
299. Cf. Jack M. Balkin, “Wrong the Day It Was Decided”: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85
B.U. L. REV. 677, 710 (2005) (contending that we want to conclude that Dred Scott and Plessy were wrongly
decided because we do not want those decisions to “reflect our nature or who we are”).
300. See id. (acknowledging that “we were once a nation premised on racial inequality and racial
ideologies”).
301. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW OR POLITICS? 145
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Once we reject as wrong even in those eras the brutal enforcement of
white supremacy, the Dred Scott and Plessy opinions become incorrect
when rendered. The wrongfulness in the Court’s behavior does not reside
only in the rulings. In Dred Scott, the Court announced repeatedly that
African Americans were inferior to white people and even declared
African Americans essentially sub-human.302 In Plessy, the Court
effectively declared that all African Americans were naturally inferior to
all white people such that the law was powerless to make any
correction.303 Simultaneously, the Plessy Court disingenuously declared
that African Americans were only imagining that the Louisiana
segregation law denigrated them.304 We can easily believe that the Court
should have been better than to hold or utter those ideas.
If we disavow the violent quest to enforce white domination as
unreasonable even in the nineteenth century, the central rulings in both
Dred Scott and Plessy also become wrong when rendered. The idea that
those rulings were “correct” (although the Constitution did not require
them) apparently would be that substantially different rulings would have
been so widely resisted that the actual rulings avoided bad social ends.305
But, what bad social outcomes did Dred Scott forestall?306 Promptly, the
South seceded and the Civil War ensued, resulting in the deaths of
750,000 people.307 (As for what the nation could then accept, the central
Dred Scott rulings that slavery was permitted in federal territories and that
black persons could not be citizens were repudiated by the Reconstruction
Amendments only a decade later).308 And what more horrible social ends
were avoided by Plessy’s holding approving de jure segregation of public
facilities or other Plessy-era rulings that, for example, helped
(1994) (describing Plessy as a “ridiculous and shameful opinion”); Eisgruber, supra note 54, at 180
(describing the Dred Scott decision as “profoundly immoral”).
302. See supra notes 122–123 and accompanying text.
303. See supra notes 186–189 and accompanying text.
304. See supra notes 190–191 and accompanying text.
305. See, e.g., GRABER, supra note 43, at 14 (asserting that “in 1860, the alternative to Dred Scott was
a civil war that—with different battlefield accidents—might have further entrenched and expanded human
bondage”); KLARMAN, supra note 43, at 21–22 (asserting, regarding Plessy, that “[r]ising white-on-black
violence, including lynchings, made segregation seem . . . a progressive solution to growing interracial
conflict”); KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 58 (noting with respect to the Williams case, from
1898, that “[d]isenfranchisement seemed preferable to racial massacres”).
306. See MALTZ, supra note 68, at 155 (noting that the majority justices in Dred Scott “clearly
misapprehended the impact their decision would have on the political disputes” of the time and did
not avert tumult and Civil War).
307. See Guy Gugliotta, New Estimate Raises Civil War Death Toll, N.Y. TIMES, April 2, 2012, at D1.
308. See supra note 129.
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disenfranchise African Americans? Contrary rulings would have been
resisted in large swaths of the country until they were finally accepted or
enforced and then followed.309 Whites may well not have suffered
significantly except, perhaps, in some cases from the eventual limitations
on their power to enjoy black subjugation.
Even assuming that renewed civil conflict had erupted and whites had
suffered greatly,310 why, if black lives mattered, would that have been a
greater tragedy than the one inflicted for many decades on innocent
African Americans and their supporters? There is no compelling reason.
Moreover, the notion that life would have been even worse for African
Americans with contrary rulings is impossible to substantiate and not
intuitive.311 The road toward equality for African Americans undoubtedly
would still have been long and torturous.312 Yet, once we see the quest to
promote white hegemony even then as wrong, there was no sound basis
for the Plessy Court to have surmised that it would be better for the nation
as a whole or for African Americans in particular that the Court conspire
in the endeavor.
The final rejoinder concerns good faith ignorance. What if the rulings
and pronouncements in Dred Scott and Plessy were based on honest
unawareness by the Court as to the indecent implications?313 Ignorance,
moral or otherwise, may be no better an explanation for the conduct of the
majority justices than their balefulness or their fear of criticism and
ostracism by those around them who were white supremacists.314 Given,
309. See, e.g., KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 47–60 (explaining that contrary rulings by
the Supreme Court on civil rights issues during the Plessy era would have been resisted in the South
and largely unenforceable).
310. See PACKARD, supra note 292, at 78 (asserting that had the Court ruled for Plessy, “it might
have started another civil war” or “so it was feared”).
311. The actual rulings, for example, did not avoid massacres of blacks by whites based on racial
hatred. In the early twentieth century, there were various race riots in which whites destroyed black
neighborhoods and killed many black residents. See ALFRED BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE
DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 (2002); JAMES S. HIRSCH, RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE
(2002); ELLIOT RUDWICK, RACE RIOT AT EAST ST. LOUIS, JULY 2, 1917 (1966); ROBERTA SENECHAL,
THE SOCIOGENESIS OF A RACE RIOT; SPRINGFIELD, ILLINOIS, IN 1908 (1990); WILLIAM M. TUTTLE,
RACE RIOT: CHICAGO IN THE RED SUMMER OF 1919 (1972).
312. See KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 59 (concluding that “even enforceable Court
decisions would have had relatively little effect on the lives of southern blacks.”).
313. See, e.g., id. at 58 (“Justices in the Plessy era were too immersed in their historical context to
spot the oppression that historical hindsight can readily see in racial practices at the turn of the
twentieth century.”). But see Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 562 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting)
(asserting that the Louisiana law “practically[] puts the brand of servitude and degradation upon a
large class of our fellow citizens”).
314. Concluding that the majority justices were either ignorant or craven still allows us to
recognize, as Jack Balkin argues we should, that anti-black racism was widely, even predominantly,
considered “reasonable” in the United States during the Dred Scott and Plessy eras. See Balkin, supra
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for example, that Frederick Douglas had published his compelling first
autobiography in 1845,315 and that seventeen African Americans had been
elected to and served in Congress between 1870 and 1887,316 the justices
in Dred Scott and Plessy had no good excuse for ignorance about the full
humanity and potential of humans of African descent.
However, assuming that we should not treat those justices “as
villains”317 (on the notion that they acted unknowingly), we can still
properly look back on the Court’s behavior as wrong when committed.
Consider a murder conviction that was based on weak evidence presented
to a gullible (rather than malicious or cowardly) jury but is thrown out
many years later when DNA evidence reveals the aged prisoner’s
innocence. Was the conviction right until it was declared wrong or wrong
all along? And which is preferable—that the reversing judge (1) throw out
the conviction without addressing the prisoner and his family, friends and
supporters, or (2) speak to the community with humility, admit that the
conviction was always erroneous, acknowledge the many years of untold
suffering by so many and apologize on behalf of the judiciary?
B.

The Argument that Contrary Rulings in Dred Scott and Plessy
Would Not Have Alleviated Black Oppression

Opponents may contend that the opinions in Dred Scott and Plessy at
least did not significantly contribute to the subjugation and suffering of
African Americans. As for Dred Scott, objectors might contend that the
Civil War and Reconstruction Amendments promptly negated the
importance of the decision. As for Plessy, objectors might urge that, had
the opinion favored Plessy, it would not have been enforced or followed
and African Americans would have endured just as much pain as they did
in actuality. Some modern scholarship casts doubt on the importance of
Dred Scott or Plessy in contributing significantly to the oppression of
African Americans.318 Based on such contentions, objectors might also
note 299, at 710.
315. See FREDERICK DOUGLAS, NARRATIVE OF THE LIFE OF FREDERICK DOUGLAS FREDERICK
(Dover Thrift ed. 1995) (originally published as Narrative of the Life of Frederick Douglas, an
American Slave, by the Anti-Slave Office, Boston, 1845) (detailing the early life of Douglas, who
escaped slavery and became a brilliant writer, eloquent orator and spokesperson for African
Americans).
316. See U.S. CONG., BLACK AMERICANS IN CONGRESS, 1870–1887, 22–25 (Matthew Wasniewski
ed., 3d ed. 2008).
317. KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 6.
318. See, e.g., LOFGREN, supra note 291, at 203–04 (contending that there is only slight evidence
of Plessy’s direct role in promoting segregation); MALTZ, supra note 68, at 154 (noting that the Civil
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argue that the decisions were not sufficiently causal regarding the injuries
visited to warrant Supreme Court expiation.
There are two answers. First, the no-causation argument is weak on its
merits. Particularly as to Plessy, we can plausibly infer that, while there
were non-judicial influences as well,319 the Court’s ruling, as opposed to
a ruling strongly in their favor, made life significantly worse for African
Americans.320 After all, the Plessy Court declared African Americans
natively inferior and authorized their segregation in public settings, which
served as a “public symbol[] and constant reminder[]” of their “inferior
position.”321 No generally accepted account would allow the Court to deny
that the decision helped stimulate the subsequent survival and burgeoning
of segregation laws.322 By officially approving as opposed to denouncing
the color-line, the ruling seems likely also to have encouraged the
increasingly hostile attitudes and vicious behaviors that developed toward
African Americans by many whites.323 Moreover, Plessy should not be
considered apart from the Supreme Court’s other anti-black decisions
from the post-bellum era, which reflected a “cumulative weakening in the
resistance to racism.”324 (Dred Scott also may have had continuing ripples
War “clearly led to the demise of the constitutional doctrines embraced by” the majority justices in
Dred Scott); see also KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 60 (asserting, regarding the Plessy era,
that “more favorable Court rulings, even if enforceable, would not have appreciably alleviated the
oppression of southern blacks”).
319. See, e.g., WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 54 (noting the influence on national attitudes about
race of the U.S. assumption of control after 1898 of over eight million “people of the colored races”
in the Caribbean and Pacific).
320. See, e.g., GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 169 (“Plessy, then, was a fulcrum, a point of departure
for southern states, immensely significant in the struggle for equal rights.”); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra
note 1, at 115 (contending that Plessy “resulted in decades of blatant segregation of blacks in public
settings” such that “the racial hierarchy was intensified and expanded, and segregation was given a
false patina of judicial legitimacy”); WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 51–56 (noting the Supreme Court’s
failure to support civil rights, including in Plessy, as one of several important factors in the South’s
“adoption of extreme racism”).
321. WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 7.
322. In his dissent in Plessy, Justice Harlan had intuited that the decision would have such an effect.
See Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 560 (1896) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (predicting that the ruling
would “encourage . . . state enactments [] to defeat the beneficent purposes” of the Reconstruction
Amendments); see also JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN, RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICA 65 (1976)
(contending that Plessy spurred more segregation laws between 1898 and 1907 affecting public
transportation and also the extension of segregation laws in other areas); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note
1, at 37 (“Plessy provided a catalyst for states to enforce segregation and inequality well beyond
public accommodations.”).
323. Justice Harlan had also intuited this consequence. See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 560 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (predicting that the decision would “stimulate aggressions, more or less brutal and
irritating, upon the admitted rights of colored citizens”).
324. See GOLDSTONE, supra note 1, at 170 (noting that, while Plessy was unremarkable in the
series, that was “the most damning thing about it,” given that the series could have been decided
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of influence in the survival of notions of black inferiority.) Considering
the series as a whole makes the lack-of-causation claim too counterintuitive to expect that anyone but proponents of that position should bear
the burden of persuasion. And scholars who have raised doubts about the
deleterious consequences of Plessy cannot disprove its influence.325
Second, causation can easily be seen as a red herring. Based on
longstanding principles that apply every day in criminal courts across the
nation, complicity liability does not require causation.326 In criminal law,
we do not absolve the aider and abettor for lack of proof that his
encouragement of the target crime induced the principal actor.327 By
encouraging the target offense, the accessory effectively steps into the
shoes of the principal.328 Likewise, while the rule has critics and some
states dissent, the accessory becomes fully liable for any other crimes of
the principal that are the natural and probable consequence.329 Applying
those principles to Dred Scott and Plessy, the target offense was the
creation of the racial hierarchy and state-mandated segregation. The
Supreme Court authorized and encouraged those outcomes and thereby
became institutionally responsible. The natural and probable consequence
was the deprivation and damage inflicted on African Americans not only
through segregation but through the racial prejudice and hatred that it
fomented. From this perspective, the argument that all of the segregation
and the associated injuries would have happened anyway—even were it
persuasive—is irrelevant.

differently); WOODWARD, supra note 1, at 53.
325. Scholars who doubt Plessy’s impact have relied in part on the inability to prove the contrary
position. See, e.g., KLARMAN, JIM CROW, supra note 43, at 48 (“measuring the effects of counterfactual
judicial rulings is a daunting task”); LOFGREN, supra note 291, at 203–04 (suggesting that Plessy may have
been one among several factors but arguing that proponents of that view cannot prove it).
326. See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 472 (7th ed. 2015) (“A secondary
party is accountable for the conduct of the primary party even if his assistance was causally
unnecessary to the commission of the offense.”).
327. See id. (“S is guilty of an offense as an accomplice even if, but for his assistance, P would
have committed the offense anyway.”).
328. See id. (“The absence of a causation requirement is premised on the underlying
rationale . . . that accomplice liability is derivative in nature.”).
329. See id. at 479 (“At common law, and today in most jurisdictions, ‘a person encouraging or
facilitating the commission of a crime [may] be held criminally liable not only for that crime, but for
any other offense that was a ‘natural and probable consequence’ of the crime aided and abetted.’”).
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The Argument that Confession and Apology Would Foster
Unproductive Illusions of Redemption and Power

Some may argue that Supreme Court confession and apology, by
acknowledging and responding to black victimization, would mostly
foster unproductive illusions of white redemption and black power. On
this view, the effort would make those whites who read Supreme Court
opinions feel badly about the racial hierarchy and Jim Crow such that they
would try to deny their own responsibility, but still feel relieved that, if
they bear any culpability for their white privilege, the Court’s apology
provides redemption. As a consequence, they would gain little motivation
to help advance black equality. Simultaneously, on this view, the effort
would encourage African Americans, in the words of Shelby Steele, to
pursue “a victim-focused racial identity.”330 That approach, Steele’s
argument suggests, could involve “trading an illusion of power for an
illusion of redemption.”331 From that vantage, the concern would be that
African Americans might be misled to believe that they could secure full
and just reparations “(with their illusion of deliverance) from the
larger society.”332
The answer to this dual-sided objection begins with clarifying what
makes a Supreme Court confession and apology part of pursuing “careful
and true development of equality between the races.”333 The risks of
misunderstandings are real, because there can never be anything close to
full redemption or full reparations for the consequences of the racial
hierarchy and segregation.334 Among various problems, including
resistance by the beneficiaries of black subjugation, we cannot adequately
identify and evaluate who owes and who is owed and how much.335 Those
problems haunt any effort to acknowledge and discuss our racial history
and pursue reconciliation.336 Before yielding to these concerns, however,
we should consider the benefit of the endeavor.
330. SHELBY STEELE, A DREAM DEFERRED 4 (1994).
331. Id. at 12.
332. Id. at 9.
333. Id. at xiii.
334. For the argument for a non-comprehensive package of reparations for African Americans,
involving monetary compensation, education programs, and transformational opportunities, see
RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS (2000); see also BORIS BITKER,
THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (1973) (focusing on Plessy as the basis for black reparations);
Coates, supra note 19 (emphasizing decades of racist housing policy).
335. See John McWhorter, Against Reparations, in SHOULD AMERICA PAY? 180, 191–93
(Raymond A. Winbush ed., 2003) (noting, among other problems, the difficulty of defining what is
owed and by whom and to whom).
336. For a comprehensive view of the African American reparations debate, see ALFRED L.
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The value of Supreme Court confession and apology finds explanation
largely in the insight offered by Janine Young Kim that race, as a social
and political construct,337 “is not purely cognitive but is also imbued with
emotional meaning.”338 That reveals, as she has explained, that pursuing
full equality between the races requires a reallocation and sharing at the
emotional level, not merely within other realms, such as the material or
the cognitive.339 Consider that because “unjust subordination is the
paradigmatic condition of racial minorities in the United States,”340 the
negative emotions of race can appropriately include “grief, anger, fear,
hatred, and disgust” at times.341 Further, those negative emotions can
“block the . . . positive feelings of joy, love, and even hope that each
believe are attached to equal status.”342 To work toward equality requires
changing the distribution of these emotions. After all, “part of being equal
is feeling equal.”343
Supreme Court confession and apology could help promote a
reallocated sharing of the positive and negative emotions of race. By
confessing the errors and harms of Dred Scott and Plessy and apologizing,
the Court could convey respect, caring, and concern for the unjustly
oppressed.344 That effort would aim to bring to all observers, including
victims, “the feeling of joy in belonging, love in fellowship, and hope for
a better future that, together with a fairer distribution of resources,
constitute a comprehensive transformation of the racial condition in the
United States.”345 At the same time, the confession and apology would
aim “to assert . . . the humanity of blacks” and to “challenge . . . the
humanity” 346 of those who might not otherwise consider the enormous
BROPHY, REPARATIONS PRO & CON (2006).
337. See JAMES BALDWIN, THE FIRE NEXT TIME 104 (1962) (“Color is not a human or personal reality;
it is a political reality.”); ALAIN LEROY LOCKE, RACE CONTACTS AND INTERRACIAL RELATIONS 5 (1992)
(recognizing that “there is no stable physical basis for the sociological concept of race”).
338. See Kim, supra note 18, at 497.
339. See id. at 497–500.
340. Id. at 490.
341. Id. at 440.
342. Id. at 498.
343. Id. at 441 (emphasis in original).
344. See ANA LUCIA ARAUJO, REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY AND THE SLAVE TRADE 5 (2017) (“A
first step in the reparatory process requires that those who benefit from the wrongdoing offer an
apology to those they victimized.”); HIGGINBOTHAM, supra note 1, at 220–21 (urging the importance
of “government . . . acknowledge[ment] [of] culpability in the racial paradigm” in any effort at racial
reconciliation and the pursuit of equality).
345. Kim, supra note 18, at 499.
346. Id. at 499–500.
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suffering caused by slavery, Jim Crow, and societal resistance to the idea
of racial equality. “Rather than seeking to . . . divide,” it would “invite[]
all to participate in a more ethical and just conception of
collective flourishing.”347
The idea of stimulating a “desire for otherness”348—a desire to feel the
negative emotions—is perhaps an under-appreciated part of pursuing
racial equality. Yet this aspect appears intertwined with helping the
oppressed move toward their rightful place in society. Michelle Alexander
urges that all of us should feel shame over the parallels between Jim Crow
(and slavery) and the modern black experience with mass incarceration
based on drug laws349 so that we commit to “dismantling this new racial
caste system.”350 James Cone wrote of the importance of white people
striving “to empathize fully with the experience of black people”351 to
“give voice to the victims” and, ultimately, to confront the sin of white
supremacy and separate ourselves “from the culture that lynched
blacks.”352 Michael Eric Dyson has urged that whites should educate
themselves about black life and culture, including slavery and the black
freedom struggle to help “close the distance between the white self and
the black other.”353 And for the Supreme Court to express its concern and
grief over Dred Scott and Plessy and the associated tragedies would
“signal that this is not ‘just a black thing,” but rather “an
American thing.”354
In the process of confessing and apologizing, the Court could also take
steps to reduce misunderstandings. The Court could underscore—while
also emphasizing the value of continuing efforts at redemption—the
inability for various reasons to achieve full reparations for Dred Scott and
Plessy, including the inability to identify and assess all of the injuries.
Recognizing that there are many victims, including those who simply
doubt the Court’s strong commitment to racial equality and human
decency, the Court could apologize both to black victims and to all who
have been fearful, troubled, or ashamed in the wake of learning about the
Court’s history. Further, the Court could deliver the confession and
347. Id. at 500.
348. Id.
349. See MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 13 (2010) (urging an understanding of “the plight of African Americans” in “this
new system of racialized social control” that “creates and maintains [a] racial hierarchy much as
earlier systems of control did”).
350. Id. at 11.
351. CONE, supra note 16, at 41.
352. Id. at 165.
353. DYSON, supra note 15, at 199–206.
354. Id. at 204–05.
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apology in a context in which there is primarily a symbolic sacrifice by
societal members that could be accepted not as divisive, but as the pursuit
of a common flourishing.
D.

The Argument that the Court Would Have to Act Arbitrarily or Be
Drawn into Undermining Its Own Credibility

Objectors may assert that atonement inevitably would lead the Court
either to act arbitrarily or to become mired in a quagmire of apologies,
undermining public confidence in its legitimacy. On this view, the Court
would appear unprincipled if it only apologized for Dred Scott and Plessy.
Over history, the Court has rendered numerous decisions that have later
been viewed by the vast majority of those who study them as wrongheaded. What about other appalling, anti-black decisions from the
antebellum era, such as Prigg,355 or from the post-bellum era, such as
Pace, or Berea College?356 What about Lochner?357 What about
Korematsu?358 What about the Court’s acquiescence in the criminalization
of intimate, gay sexual encounters in Bowers v. Hardwick?359 And what
about the Court’s historical treatment of Native Americans?360 If the Court
is to begin confessing embarrassing errors and apologizing, the argument
would proceed, it should atone for some or all of those decisions and
several others as well. At the same time, the objection would continue, if
the Court were to offer mea culpa after mea culpa, it could undermine the
355. For discussion of Prigg, see supra notes 110–119 and accompanying text.
356. For discussion of Pace and Berea College, see supra notes 151–152, 181–182, and
accompanying text.
357. For discussion of the reasons that Lochner has been widely viewed in the modern era (although
with an increase in libertarian dissent) as fundamentally erroneous, see Greene, supra note 9, at 417–22.
358. For discussion of why Korematsu is difficult to defend using conventional constitutional
arguments, see id. at 422–27.
359. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (“Bowers
was not correct when it was decided, and it is not correct today. It ought not to remain binding
precedent. Bowers v. Hardwick should be and now is overruled.”).
360. Consider Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823). There, the Supreme Court declined to
recognize title to land sold by an Indian tribe to a private person and declared that Native Americans
had been “savages” who had no right to the land that warranted legal recognition. See id. at 590–91,
604–05. We should not forget that “[a] long-established language of racism that speaks of the
American Indian as an uncivilized, lawless, and warlike savage can be found at work throughout the
leading Indian law decisions of the nineteenth-century U.S. Supreme Court.” ROBERT A. WILLIAMS,
JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY
OF RACISM IN AMERICA 33 (2005) (footnote omitted).
Recent scholarly work has substantiated the widespread enslavement of indigenous people in our
nation even after the middle of the nineteenth century. See ANDRÉS RESÉNDEZ, THE OTHER SLAVERY
295–314 (2016).
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public view that it operates mostly as a neutral interpreter of the
Constitution. The perception might take hold that the justices in the past
frequently made up the meaning of the document on bad reasoning and
that the justices today must frequently do the same.
The answer to this grievance begins with a simple denial that the Court
must go deeply into the atonement business to atone for Dred Scott and
Plessy. While the Court has made various decisions that later have been
widely deemed erroneous,361 Dred Scott and Plessy are easily understood
as warranting particular shame and special expiation.362 As we have seen,
even among the Court’s anti-black decisions, Dred Scott and Plessy most
openly dismissed the humanity of African Americans and endorsed the
racial hierarchy.363 That is largely why they, along with Lochner, occupy
the center of constitutional law’s anti-canon.364 But, even Lochner is a
“less demonic precedent than Dred [Scott] and Plessy.”365 Not only do
they seem distinctively depraved, the Court itself holds essentially all the
power to decide which of its past decisions are so disgraceful as to warrant
the institution’s most dramatic atonement. If the Court were to decide to
confess and apologize only for Dred Scott and Plessy, there is little reason
to think that major public campaigns would mount to press for many other
Supreme Court atonements.366
Without causing much further complication, however, the Court could
cite Dred Scott and Plessy as representative of its anti-black decisions
throughout most of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and
apologize for that broader failing.367 In the process, the Court could
acknowledge the associated harms, most of which it could still tie to its
negative declarations about blacks and the endorsement of the racial
hierarchy in Dred Scott and Plessy. In that way, the Court could
effectively also apologize for decisions such as Prigg, Pace, and Berea
College, among others. That approach would not require the Court to
pursue the same level of atonement for all of its other rejected decisions
that did not involve black subjugation. The Court’s historical debasement
361. See Greene, supra note 9, at 386–96 (discussing various Supreme Court cases that are widely
thought to have been wrongly decided).
362. See Savage, supra note 6 (noting that these two cases top the list of Supreme Court decisions
widely regarded as the worst of all time).
363. See supra notes 120–128, 183–189, and accompanying text.
364. See Amar, Plessy v. Ferguson, supra note 9, at 76 (asserting that those three occupy “the
lowest circle of constitutional hell”).
365. Id. at 81.
366. Would confessing and apologizing once for Dred Scott and Plessy foment calls for the Court
to do the same thing repeatedly? While some repetition might be good, it seems doubtful that the
Court would face problematic pressure of this nature.
367. See supra text accompanying notes 129–228.
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of black people and the associated injuries to them and all who have
suffered vicariously are plausibly understood as the institution’s most
dishonorable legacy.368
Would Supreme Court atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy alone (or
in their representative capacities) tend to undermine the Court’s
legitimacy by effectively revealing that the Court creates constitutional
meaning? This concern seems overwrought. Dred Scott and Plessy are
already widely recognized among those who pay attention to Supreme
Court opinions and history as severely misguided. For the Court to
acknowledge that they were erroneous decisions that endorsed unjust and
destructive propositions would only catch up with, rather than challenge,
that informed, popular opinion. Nor is it demonstrably bad that more
citizens understand that the Supreme Court must often construct, rather
than merely discern and apply, constitutional doctrines.369
IV. PURSUING ATONEMENT WHILE LIMITING THE
DEATH PENALTY
Having addressed why the Supreme Court should atone for Dred Scott
and Plessy, this Article posits that abolishing the death penalty for
aggravated murder would provide an appropriate context to do so. This
Part offers three reasons, besides the availability of a plausible approach
for the Court to implement such a plan as constitutional law, which is the
subject of Part VI. First, abolition is relevant to atonement. Studies
concerning racial discrimination in capital selection and parallels between
modern executions and Jim Crow-era lynchings provide grounds to
understand the modern application of the death penalty as both a product
368. Cf. David Brooks, Opinion, The Case for Reparations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2019, at A27
(contending that the continuing effects of the racial hierarchy represent a national social crisis).
369. See JAMES E. FLEMING, FIDELITY TO OUR IMPERFECT CONSTITUTION: FOR MORAL READINGS
AND AGAINST ORIGINALISMS xi (2015) (defending “conceptions of the Constitution as embodying
abstract moral and political principles—not codifying concrete historical rules or practices—and of
interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best
understood”). See also Scott W. Howe, Slavery As Punishment: Original Public Meaning, Cruel and
Unusual Punishment, and the Neglected Clause in the Thirteenth Amendment, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 983,
1034 (2009) (concluding that the “slavery-as-punishment clause should remind all of us why [the]
original public meaning, even when clear, does not resolve the modern meaning of the constitution”);
Lawrence Rosenthal, An Empirical Inquiry into the Use of Originalism: Fourth Amendment
Jurisprudence During the Career of Justice Scalia, 70 HASTINGS L.J. 75, 75 (2019) (determining that
during Justice Scalia’s career, “less than 14% of the opinions of the Court addressing a disputed
question of Fourth Amendment law were originalist”); Solum, supra note 295, at 458 (contending
that, even from a perspective focused on finding original meaning, “the actual text of the U.S.
Constitution contains general, abstract, and vague provisions that require constitutional construction
for their application to concrete constitutional cases”).
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and perpetuation of the violent, white hegemony that the Court abetted in
Dred Scott and Plessy.370 The second reason likewise focuses on the
relevance of abolition but also on the questionable utility of the death
sanction. Modern capital punishment has such modest penological value
when applied to aggravated murder as to further imply that it would
already have disappeared had it not gained earlier momentum as an
outgrowth of and instrument for maintaining the racial hierarchy.371 The
final reason addresses whether abolition of the death penalty for
aggravated murder would have enough positive impact on African
Americans and their supporters to underscore sincere judicial atonement.
The answer is that prompt abolition would not only eliminate racial
discrimination in the use of the death penalty but could also have
important symbolic value even apart from the opportunity that such a
course poses for achieving the secondary benefits of apologizing for Dred
Scott and Plessy.372
A.

Linkage Between the Death Penalty and the Color-Line

The central argument for focusing on partial abolition of capital
punishment as the vehicle for atonement is that the modern death penalty
appears to have descended from the country’s quest for white
supremacy.373 Many students of the death penalty have asserted this
integral connection, including prominent leaders of the African-American
community.374 The conclusion that the death penalty links to the
maintenance of the color-line rests heavily on evidence that the death
penalty in the post-Furman era has continued to be applied in a racialized
fashion, even if less so than in the Jim Crow era.375 The point (for present
purposes) is not that the death penalty is unfair to some but not all guilty
murderers who receive it, or to some but not all murder victims whose
killers fail to receive it,376 but rather that the death penalty doubtfully
would exist as a punishment for aggravated murder today in the United
States absent the long, brutal quest to subjugate blacks and maintain white
370. See infra text accompanying notes 373–413.
371. See infra text accompanying notes 414–432.
372. See infra text accompanying notes 433–444.
373. See Austin Sarat, The Rhetoric of Race in the “New Abolitionism,” in FROM LYNCH MOBS TO
THE KILLING STATE 260, 264 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2006) (“Criticism of capital

punishment should focus on the work it does as a living embodiment of the legacy of lynching and
the system of white privilege that it expressed.”).
374. See supra notes 20, 27, and accompanying text.
375. See infra notes 379–404 and accompanying text.
376. The racial disparities also reveal a separate “inequality” aspect of unfairness regarding the
death penalty for murder. See infra notes 465–474 and accompanying text.
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supremacy. Additional evidence to support that conclusion comes from
research that shows corresponding state patterns in the relative levels of
use of lynching in the Plessy era as compared to the relative levels of use
in modern times of the death penalty.377 Thus, focusing on limited
abolition of the death penalty as the context for Supreme Court expiation
builds on the constitutive tie between the violence associated historically
with maintaining the judicially sanctioned color-line and the racialized
state violence embodied in the modern death penalty.378 This linkage
makes limited abolition a germane context in which to atone for Dred
Scott and Plessy.
1.

Racialized Use of the Modern Death Penalty

Many studies of capital sentencing combine to suggest that the racial
hierarchy that the Court endorsed in Dred Scott and Plessy is crucial in
explaining the survival of death as a sanction for murder in the modern
era.379 With high consistency, studies have shown pronounced whitevictim favoritism by capital decision-makers.380 Evidence of the operation
of prejudice against African-American capital defendants is more
equivocal,381 although some studies have shown that influence as well.382
The studies also have taken place in enough states to conclude that race
377. See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 66 (noting the correlation between high and low lynching states
“at the dawn of the 20th Century” and the high and low execution states “late in the twentieth century”).
378. Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 20, at 49 (contending that “the administration of capital
punishment in the United States, like the practice of lynching, is one of the state practices by means
of which the racial polity is reproduced”); Sarat, supra note 373, at 273 (asserting that “the death
penalty itself perpetuates prejudice, discrimination, and racial subordination”).
379. See LINDA E. CARTER, ELLEN S. KREITZBERG & SCOTT W. HOWE, UNDERSTANDING CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT LAW 364 (4th ed. 2018) (asserting the prevalence of race discrimination in capital
selection and noting some of the supporting studies); Catherine M. Grosso et al., Race Discrimination
and the Death Penalty: An Empirical and Legal Overview, in AMERICA’S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 525–76 (Charles S. Lanier, Robert Bohm & James Acker eds., 3rd ed. 2014) (discussing
various studies); David C. Baldus & George Woodworth, Race Discrimination in the Administration
of the Death Penalty: An Overview of the Empirical Evidence with Special Emphasis on the Post1990 Research, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 194 (2003) (summarizing various studies).
380. See, e.g., U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GGD-90-57, DEATH PENALTY SENTENCING: RESEARCH
INDICATES PATTERN OF RACIAL DISPARITIES 6 (1990) (study based on synthesizing twenty-eight other
studies and concluding that race-of-victim bias typically strongly influences capital selection).
381. See id. (asserting that race-of-defendant bias is typically more equivocal or not identifiable).
382. See, e.g., Scott W. Howe, The Futile Quest for Racial Neutrality in Capital Selection and the Eighth
Amendment Argument for Abolition Based on Unconscious Racial Discrimination, 45 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 2083, 2118–19 (2004) (summarizing studies finding discrimination against black defendants and black
victims); Scott Phillips, Racial Disparities in the Capital of Capital Punishment, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 807,
837–39 (2008) (study regarding capital selection in Harris County, Texas, finding that black defendants and
killers of white victims were disfavored in the overall selection process).
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bias has continued to play a central role in the use of the capital sanction
generally in the United States.383
The most famous of the post-Furman studies, conducted by lead
investigator David Baldus, focused on the Georgia system in the 1970s
and was the basis for the separate challenges under the Equal Protection
Clause and the Eighth Amendment that the Supreme Court rejected in
McCleskey v. Kemp.384 For all suspects charged with murder in Georgia
between 1973 and 1979, the Baldus researchers found the following
death-sentencing rates in four categories of race-of-defendant and raceof-victim combinations:
Race of Defendant & Victim Death-Sentencing Rate:
black defendant/white victim .21 (50/233)
white defendant/white victim .08 (58/748)
black defendant/black victim .01 (18/1443)
white defendant/black victim .03 (2/60)
TOTAL. 05 (128/2488)385
Those skewed figures went far on their own to substantiate that the
flames of prejudice that the Court fanned in Dred Scott and Plessy
continued to play a central role in explaining the operation of Georgia’s
post-Furman death-penalty system. Nonetheless, one could postulate—
however unlikely given our history of racial animus386—that unapparent,
legitimate factors might correlate with the racial factors to explain the
Georgia capital-sentencing outcomes. To test that hypothesis, the Baldus
researchers investigated 230 variables for each case and each defendant
and employed sophisticated statistical techniques, including crosstabulations and multivariate regression analysis.387 They found no
combination of legitimate variables that could come close to explaining
the results.388 They concluded that the figures reflected what they seemed

383. See, e.g., BRANDON L. GARRETT, END OF ITS ROPE: HOW KILLING THE DEATH PENALTY CAN
REVIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 84 (2017) (asserting that “study after study in nearly every death penalty
state” shows a race-of-victim influence).
384. See DAVID C. BALDUS, GEORGE WOODWORTH & CHARLES A. PULASKI, JR., EQUAL JUSTICE AND
3 (1990) [hereinafter BALDUS STUDY] (noting that the study provided the basis for
litigation over the claim of racial discrimination in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987)).
THE DEATH PENALTY

385. See id. at 315 tbl.50.
386. See, e.g., McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (asserting the need to consider
our racial history in assessing the plausible explanations for the disparities).
387. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 384, at 46.
388. See id. at 316.
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to reflect—virulent prejudice by decision-makers, whether conscious
or not.389
The Baldus study indicated that race powerfully influenced case
outcomes. The researchers estimated that the odds were 4.3 times higher
that a defendant would receive the death penalty solely because his victim
was white rather than black.390 In part because the vast majority of
murders were intra-racial and, as in the Jim Crow era, there was often less
intense pursuit of the maximum punishment in cases involving black
victims,391 black defendants had a modest advantage over white
defendants across all cases.392 Nonetheless, within white-victim cases, the
researchers estimated that a black defendant faced odds of receiving the
death penalty 2.4 times higher solely because he was black rather than
white.393 Thus, the odds of a death sentence facing a black defendant who
killed a white victim were many times higher than those facing a white
defendant who killed a black victim under otherwise
identical circumstances.
Various subsequent studies of modern capital selection in many
jurisdictions have consistently confirmed the operation of racial
prejudices, including several studies conducted in the last decade.394 A
study in the state of Washington recently found that “juries are more than
four times as likely to impose a death sentence in cases involving Black
defendants (after controlling for case characteristics).”395 A recent study
in Louisiana revealed “racial disparities even more striking than the
Georgia disparities the Court tolerated in its McCleskey decision.”396 A
2013 California study found major disparities favoring white victims in
charging decisions in murder cases between the North and South of

389. See id.
390. See id.
391. See supra notes 215–216.
392. See BALDUS STUDY, supra note 384, at 328.
393. See id.
394. See supra notes 395–401 and accompanying text.
395. Katherine Beckett & Heather Evans, Race, Death, and Justice: Capital Sentencing in
Washington State, 1981-2014, 6 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 77, 103–04 (2016).
396. STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 110; see also Frank R. Baumgartner & Tim Lyman,
Race-of-Victim Discrepancies in Homicides and Executions, Louisiana 1976-2015, 17 LOY. J. PUBLIC
INT. L. 129, 141 (2015) (finding that, in Louisiana, “the likelihood of being executed for [killing an
African-American male] in th[e] modern era is forty-eight times lower than for the killing of a white
woman”); Glenn L. Pierce & Michael L. Radelet, Death Sentencing in East Baton Rouge Parish,
1990–2008, 71 LA. L. REV. 647, 670–71 (2011) (finding that in an urban Louisiana parish, “the odds
of a death sentence are 97% higher for those who kill whites than for those who kill blacks”).
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Alameda County.397 A study from North Carolina, published in 2011,
found that “the odds of a death sentence for those . . . suspected of killing
Whites are approximately three times higher than the odds of a death
sentence for those suspected of killing Blacks.”398 The studies are not
always as sophisticated as the original Baldus study;399 they do not
consistently find race-of-defendant prejudice;400 and they vary on whether
it is the prosecutors or juries who discriminate.401 Nonetheless, the
implication from the combined studies that racial prejudice influences
capital selection on a broad geographic scale is powerful.
The combined racial studies also tend to substantiate that the death
penalty for aggravated murder in the United States would have altogether
or nearly disappeared by now if we had never had the color-line.
Considered alone, those studies do not prove the point beyond doubt. The
death penalty has survived although the studies also show that its use in
the post-Furman era is substantially less racialized than was capital
selection during the Jim Crow era.402 The countervailing point, however,
is that overall use of the death penalty also has dwindled in recent
decades.403 That could mean that to the extent that racism has moderated
and that there is increased concern with consistency and fairness
(including the desire to avoid executing the innocent),404 there is less
397. See Steven F. Shatz & Terry Dalton, Challenging the Death Penalty with Statistics: Furman,
McCleskey, and a Single County Case Study, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1227, 1229–30 (2013).
398. Michael L. Radelet & Glenn L. Pierce, Race and Death Sentencing in North Carolina, 19802007, 89 N.C. L. REV. 2119, 2145 (2011).
399. See, e.g., Howe, supra note 382, at 2111 (noting various studies that were not as thorough as
the original Baldus study).
400. See, e.g., Pierce & Radelet, supra note 396, at 670 (noting that “the race of the defendant had
no value in predicting who is sentenced to death”).
401. Compare, e.g., Phillips, supra note 382, at 830, 834 (in Houston, prosecutors but not juries
discriminate), with Beckett & Evans, supra note 395, at 103–04 (in Washington state, juries rather
than prosecutors are the problem).
402. Compare, for example, the statistics from the original Baldus study in Georgia, see supra note
385 and accompanying text, with the statistics regarding the use of the death penalty for rape in the
Jim Crow era. See supra notes 283–284 and accompanying text. See also David C. Baldus et. al.,
Arbitrariness and Discrimination in the Administration of the Death Penalty: A Challenge to State
Supreme Courts, 15 STETSON L. REV. 133, 158–61 (1986) (asserting that “by and large, the evidence
of race-of-defendant discrimination, particularly the most recent evidence, is neither strong nor
consistent” and that there was a “strong and systematic bias against black defendants” in the “preFurman sentencing patterns in the South”).
403. See infra notes 424–430 and accompanying text.
404. In the modern era, “the rhetorical center of abolitionist argument has come to focus less on
race and more on claims of actual innocence.” Sarat, supra note 373, at 263. However, the modern
concern with innocence as an argument against capital punishment can be understood as connected
to a reduction in racism. In the Jim Crow context, when the state-imposed death penalty was replacing
lynching, the guilt of the defendant often did not matter. See Michael J. Klarman, The Racial Origins
of Modern Criminal Procedure, 99 MICH. L. REV. 48, 57 (2000). Just as “the purpose of a lynching
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interest in using the death penalty. On that view, the suspicion remains
from the totality of racial studies that our history of white hegemony is
integral to the continuing existence of the death penalty where it has not
yet disappeared. The inference is also made difficult to refute by the
counter-factual nature of any reimagining of our past and present without
the racial hierarchy that the Court abetted, rather than eschewed, in Dred
Scott and Plessy.
2.

Modern Executions and Jim Crow-Era Lynchings

The parallels between patterns of modern executions and patterns of
Jim Crow-era lynchings also help substantiate that without the violently
enforced color-line, capital punishment for aggravated murder would not
have survived in the United States. In a study published in 2003, Franklin
Zimring found that states with high lynching rates from 1889 to 1968405
tended to be high execution states between 1977 and 2000.406 He also
found that states that had abandoned the death penalty tended to be states
with low or minimal lynching rates from 1889 to 1968.407 Those findings
usually was to ensure black subordination rather than to punish guilt,” death-penalty trials in that
context “had little to do with establishing factual guilt or innocence.” Id.
405. Regarding lynching, Zimring ranked states according to their absolute number of lynchings
for two periods: 1889 to 1918 and 1882 to 1968. See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 208, tbl.A.1. There
were only minor ranking variances between states for these two periods. See id. For the full 1889 to
1968 period, the top fourteen states ranked as follows: (1) Mississippi; (2) Georgia; (3) Texas;
(4) Louisiana; (5) Alabama; (6) Arkansas; (7) Florida; (8) Tennessee; (9) Kentucky; (10) South
Carolina; (11 and 12) Missouri and Oklahoma (tie); (13) North Carolina; (14) Virginia. See id. For
the full 1889 to 1968 period, the bottom fourteen states ranked as follows: (31) Idaho; (32) Iowa;
(33) North Dakota; (34) Minnesota; (35, 36, and 37) Michigan, Pennsylvania, and Utah (tie);
(38) Nevada and Wisconsin (tie); (40 and 41) New Jersey and New York (tie); (42) Delaware, Maine,
and Vermont (tie). See id.
406. See id. at 95–96.
407. Zimring provided a chart that roughly summarized the correlations:
Executions 1977—2000 in High-versus Low-Lynching States
14
High-Lynching
States
Alabama
Arkansas
Florida
Georgia
Kentucky
Louisiana
Mississippi
Missouri
North Carolina

Execution
Records
1997-2000
23
23
50
23
2
26
4
46
16

14
Execution
Low-Lynching
Records
States
1997-2000
Connecticut
None
Delaware
11
Maine
None*
Massachusetts
None*
Michigan
None*
Minnesota
None*
Nevada
8
New Hampshire
None
New Jersey
None

10 Howe.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

5/30/20 11:47 PM

DRED SCOTT, PLESSY, AND THE DEATH PENALTY

793

suggest408 that an important explanation for lynching during the Jim Crow
era—enforcement of the racial hierarchy409—is also important in
explaining the survival of capital punishment through the twentieth
century. That view also conforms with evidence of a transition from
lynchings toward mob-dominated, death penalty trials—essentially sham
proceedings—in the Jim Crow regions in an effort to give a legal veneer
to what still amounted to racial subjugation through violence.410 Zimring
noted that the “saga of lynching” was linked to “racial repression” and
that “the lynching tradition as a[n] historical institution . . . seems to have
lasting influence on capital punishment in parts of the United States.”411
He found it “likely” that the history of a “coercive white supremacist
context” is central to the explanation for the “willingness to execute” in
those states in which capital punishment has survived most vigorously.412
With particular concern for the brutal violence associated with the colorline, that conclusion underscores the relevance of substantial abolition of
the death penalty as a vehicle for judicial atonement.413
Oklahoma
30
New York
None
South Carolina
25
Pennsylvania
3
Tennessee
1
Rhode Island
None*
Texas
239
Vermont
None*
Virginia
81
Wisconsin
None*
*No death penalty in effect throughout the period.
See id. at 95, tbl.5.1.
408. Given the rankings on lynching, the comparisons in Zimring’s chart, see supra note 407, reflect
some inconsistencies, although the overall picture remains one of positive correlation. Mississippi, for
example, ranked as first in historical lynchings but had few modern executions. Likewise, some of the other
historically high-lynching states—for example, Kentucky and Tennessee—were not high-execution states
in the modern era. Further, some of the historically low-lynching states—for example, Delaware and
Nevada—had more executions in the modern era than one might have expected. Zimring noted some of the
non-symmetries. See ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 117.
Developments since 2003 have reduced some of the seeming anomalies among the historically lowlynching states. Delaware has abolished the death penalty. See Carter et. al., supra note 379, at 483.
It is also noteworthy that Nevada has not executed anyone since 2006, and Pennsylvania has not
executed anyone since 1999. See Death Penalty Information, supra note 35.
409. See supra notes 219–228 and accompanying text; see also Klarman, supra note 404, at 57
(noting that, well into era of Jim Crow in the South, the “purpose of a lynching usually was to ensure
black subordination rather than to punish guilt”).
410. See, e.g., Klarman, supra note 404, at 55–57 (noting that the decline in lynchings in the 1920s
appeared dependent on their replacement by such state-run exercises and concluding that “the stateimposed death penalty in these cases was little more than a formalization of the lynching process”).
411. ZIMRING, supra note 20, at 90.
412. Id. at 116–17.
413. An additional symmetry would also favor the abolition proposal. Given Zimring’s findings,
partial abolition would tend to have the most direct impact (in eliminating death sentences) in the
states that had the most lynchings. The proposal would also eliminate the federal death penalty for
murder and, in that sense, apply nation-wide to a small number of death sentences. Yet that outcome
also appears appropriate in that lynching, while very much a regional malady, was also “a national
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Dubious Utility of the Penalty Absent a Racialized Polity

An examination of death penalty rationales further shows that abolition
of the capital sanction for aggravated murder bears relevance to the
Court’s decisions in Dred Scott and Plessy. The generally unstated and
improper rationale seems to be the punishment’s role in honoring “the
Racial Contract”—the imbedded understanding among most whites that
whites are the people who matter.414 The privileging of whiteness is
usually tacit in the death-selection process and almost always in public
discussions about the benefits of capital punishment.415 The implicit
nature of this understanding has aided the perpetuation of the sanction by
conferring deniability of invidious purpose.416 However, the modern death
penalty is of questionable legitimate utility in the United States,417 which
suggests that it survives in important measure because it has long been
valued, at least subconsciously, for its symbolic reminder of the violence
available and the willingness to use it to maintain the racial hierarchy.
Consider the spoken rationales for capital punishment: desert and
deterrence.418 Under those two theories, it is the marginal value of the
death penalty over the maximum alternative punishment—perpetual
imprisonment—that matters.419 However, the death penalty for

practice,” indeed, “a practice that helped define the boundaries of the nation.” ASHRAF H.A. RUSHDY,
AMERICAN LYNCHING ix (2012). For example, Congress repeatedly failed to enact proposed antilynching legislation “throughout the lynching era,” even if that was largely because “Southern white
representatives predictably and consistently protested so-called federal interference in local affairs.”
EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 81.
414. CHARLES W. MILLS, THE RACIAL CONTRACT 3 (1997).
415. See, e.g., Kaufman-Osborn, supra note 20, at 46 (noting that “executions are now performed
not in the name of white hegemony but in the name of a citizenry that, as liberalism requires, is
abstract in the sense of without color.”).
416. See id. at 48–49 (asserting that the importation of “practices constitutive of due process” in
the capital-selection process masks “the continued articulation of the racial contract within a polity
that no longer espouses the rhetoric of white supremacy.”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292–
97 (1987) (rejecting equal protection challenge resting on statistical evidence of discrimination
because of the absence of evidence that any of the decision-makers in capital case “acted with a
discriminatory purpose”). Cf. Kimberlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment:
Transformation and Legitimation in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1379–83
(1988) (asserting, in the civil-rights context, that the elimination of race conscious laws does not
eliminate racism but “creates the illusion that racism is no longer the primary factor responsible” for
racially disparate outcomes).
417. See infra notes 418–432 and accompanying text.
418. See Richard O. Lempert, Desert and Deterrence: An Assessment of the Moral Bases of the
Case for Capital Punishment, 79 MICH. L. REV. 1177, 1178–79 (1981).
419. See, e.g., CARTER ET. AL., supra note 379, at 10 (noting that, regarding deterrence, the
marginal effect is what matters).
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aggravated murder is carried out so infrequently and arbitrarily, and so
long after the crime, that skepticism has long existed over its deterrent
value.420 Those problems also undermine the notion that the death penalty
represents appropriate deserts, as does the evidence that racial bias affects
death selection.421 We have no way to plausibly determine in nonracialized terms that certain people “deserve” the death penalty when
“[t]he social meaning of murder . . . comes to vary systematically with the
races of those involved.”422 The idea of deserved death sentences,
uninfluenced by race, seems especially fanciful when almost all of the
worst murderers escape that sanction.423
The rationalizations for capital punishment have become even more
problematic in the last two decades due to the reduced, fragmented, and
halting use of the sanction.424 Out of the several thousand persons who
annually commit a murder in the United States, the total number who
received a death sentence fell to 42 in 2018, down from 295 in 1998.425

420. See, e.g., Jack Greenberg, Against the American System of Capital Punishment, 99 HARV. L.
REV. 1670, 1670 (1986) (“I submit that this system is deeply incompatible with the proclaimed
objectives of death penalty proponents.”); Lempert, supra note 418, at 1225 (concluding that “the
renewed effort to punish by death cannot withstand . . . scrutiny” on either desert or deterrence
theories); see also BARRY NAKELL & KENNETH A. HARDY, THE ARBITRARINESS OF THE DEATH
PENALTY 1, 161 (1987) (noting the rarity of a death sentence and ultimately concluding that, because
of its arbitrariness, “the Court should no longer permit it to be carried out”).
421. See supra notes 379–404 and accompanying text; Lempert, supra note 418, at 1184–85
(asserting that a desert theory cannot justify distributing capital punishment in “an invidious or
inconsistent fashion”).
422. Michael Cholbi & Alex Madva, Black Lives Matter and the Call for Death Penalty Abolition,
128 ETHICS 517, 519 (2018) (emphasis omitted).
423. See, e.g., John Blume et al., Explaining Death Row’s Population and Racial Composition, 1
J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 165, 172 tbl.1 (2004) (noting that the death-sentencing rate among murder
arrestees in Georgia from 1977 to 1999 was 0.022—243 death sentences out of 10,912 murder
arrestees).
If capital punishment had modest value based on the spoken rationales of desert and deterrence,
evidence that death sentences are much more expensive than sentences of perpetual imprisonment
would still weigh against it as a social policy. See, e.g., CARTER ET. AL., supra note 379, at 10
(summarizing the policy debate and the many studies concluding that a death sentence costs
substantially more than a sentence of life imprisonment without parole).
424. See generally Glossip v. Gross, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2726, 2759–70 (2015) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting).
425. The following chart shows the twenty-one-year decline:
Year:
Sentences:
Year:
Sentences:

1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
295

279

223

153 166

151

138

140

123 126

2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017
120 118

114

85

82

83

74

49

31

39
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(Essentially all murders are constitutionally death-eligible, given that,
while the Court also has required the finding of an “aggravating
circumstance,” there is expansive latitude on what is aggravating and on
the number of possible aggravators a state can specify.426) Death sentences
also now are largely concentrated in only a few counties, even within
states that retain the death penalty.427 In addition, twenty-two states plus
the District of Columbia have abolished capital punishment, with ten
having jettisoned it in the last twenty years.428 Moreover, among the
twenty-eight states that retain the death penalty, nine have not executed
anyone in more than a decade, and fifteen have not executed anyone since
2012.429 Gavin Newsome, the governor of California, which has the
largest death row, also recently declared a moratorium on executions in
that state.430 We also should acknowledge that, between 2004 and 2014,
the average delay between sentencing and execution grew from
approximately eleven years to approximately eighteen years.431 Given
those developments, any claim that our actual capital punishment system
legitimately serves desert and deterrence goals warrants
extreme skepticism.432

Year:
Sentences:

2018
42

See Death Penalty Information Center, supra note 35, at 3.
426. See generally Scott W. Howe, Repudiating the Narrowing Rule in Capital Sentencing, 2012
BYU L. REV. 1477, 1482–1503. See also EVAN J. MANDERY, A WILD JUSTICE: THE DEATH AND
RESURRECTION OF CAPITAL PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 362 (2013) (noting that the post-Furman,
death-penalty statute from Georgia that the Supreme Court first upheld in 1976 has ten aggravating
circumstances that cover almost all murders).
427. See Glossip, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. at 2774 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (citing data to support
conclusion that “the number of active death penalty counties is small and getting smaller”).
428. The twenty-three jurisdictions without the death penalty, with the year of abolition or judicial
rejection in parentheses, are: Alaska (1957); Colorado (2020); Connecticut (2012); Delaware (2016);
District of Columbia (1981); Hawaii (1957); Illinois (2011); Iowa (1965); Maine (1887); Maryland
(2013); Massachusetts (1984); Michigan (1847); Minnesota (1911); New Hampshire (2019); New
Jersey (2007); New Mexico (2009); New York (2007); North Dakota (1973); Rhode Island (1984);
Vermont (1972); Washington (2018); West Virginia (1965); Wisconsin (1853). See DEATH PENALTY
INFO. CTR., State By State, https://deathpenaltyinfo.org/state-and-federal-info/state-by-state
[https://perma.cc/N5BK-VGLU].
429. See id.
430. See Opinion, A Pause for California’s Death Row, N.Y. TIMES, March 13, 2019, at A26
(noting that the governor’s order granted temporary reprieves to 737 condemned inmates).
431. See Glossip, __ U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. at 2764 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
432. See Corinna Barrett Lain, Following Finality: Why Capital Punishment Is Collapsing Under
Its Own Weight, in FINAL JUDGMENTS: THE DEATH PENALTY IN AMERICAN LAW AND CULTURE 30,
49 (Austin Sarat ed., 2017) (“The dramatic decline in death sentences and executions . . . has
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Recognizing the problems with the rationales for capital punishment as
it actually operates has two pertinent implications. First, the problems
imply that another rationale, less pleasing, has helped explain capital
punishment where it has not already crumbled. That conclusion hints,
again, that the explanation centers on our sordid history of Courtendorsed, racial oppression. Second, the problems imply that our current
system of capital punishment lacks much legitimate social value. This
lack of value means that abolishing the sanction for murder would entail
minimal social costs.
C.

The Potential Value of Abolition to Convey Sincerity

The third reason to use partial abolition to pursue atonement is its
potential value, largely symbolic, in underscoring the Court’s sincerity.
By expressly acknowledging capital punishment’s heritage in racial
intimidation, the Court could imbue a decision announcing abolition with
support for African-American humanity and equality whether or not the
Court also included a forceful apology for Dred Scott and Plessy. If
abolishing the death penalty for aggravated murder could stand alone as a
decision conveying such an important message, it could also appropriately
accentuate the Court’s bona fides in pursuing expiation.
Some critics might assert that under-enforcement in black-victim
murder cases is the primary discrimination problem with the death penalty
today.433 They might urge that the Court would do better to respect
African Americans by continuing to try to increase the proportional use
of the death penalty in black-victim cases. Without minimizing continuing
discrimination, these critics could correctly note that a positive
redistribution of death sentences has occurred since the Jim Crow era.434
Even some whites who have committed racial-hatred murders against
blacks in the modern era have received the death penalty, which sends a
message that black lives matter, too.435 Thus, abolishing the death penalty
substantially negated the penological justifications that supported the death penalty in the first
place.”).
433. See, e.g., Randall L. Kennedy, McCleskey v. Kemp: Race, Capital Punishment, and the
Supreme Court, 101 HARV. L REV. 1388, 1436 (1988) (arguing that states could “level-up,” meaning
that they could increase the proportion of death sentences in black-victim murder cases); id. at 1436–
39 (reiterating that leveling up is a viable solution); KENNEDY, supra note 138, at 344–45 (reiterating
that leveling up is plausible).
434. See supra note 402 and accompanying text.
435. In terms of infamy, two cases would appear near the top of any such list. In Texas, two white
supremacists were executed for the brutal, race-hatred, killing in 1998 of an African American, James
Byrd, Jr. See Campbell Robertson, Texas Executes Man for 1998 Dragging Death, N.Y. TIMES, April
25, 2019, at A18. Also, in federal court in South Carolina, a white supremacist was sentenced to death
in 2017 for killing nine African-American churchgoers in Charleston, South Carolina in 2015. See
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for murder now, these critics might assert, would amount to eliminating a
valuable public commodity just as it is beginning to be distributed in a
way that helps the African-American community.
The problem with the view of the death penalty as a legitimate public
commodity is that the sanction has no such status, and there is no chance
that the Court can make it qualify. The legitimate-public-commodity
perspective represents an idealized view of the death penalty that has little
connection to reality. Supreme Court regulation over the last fifty years
has failed to bring about either a selection system that distributes death
sentences with adequate fairness or the regularity to provide legitimate
desert and deterrence outcomes.436 The best we can say is that the Court’s
death-penalty regulation has contributed to some reduction in the
influence of racism but also to the dwindling use of the sanction, which,
in turn, demonstrates how well states can get along without it.437 We
should not imagine that the Court can now suddenly encourage a fair
“leveling up” so that many more black-victim murderers receive the
penalty. There is no workable methodology to bring about such a result.438
A refusal to partially abolish capital punishment based on such a claim is
not a better way to respect African Americans.
A separate group of critics, however, might emphasize that the death
penalty is already crumbling to deny that substantial abolition would
adequately honor African Americans. Those critics might contend that,
even if the Court does not abolish the sanction for aggravated murder,
states will continue to abandon it. If states would all soon abandon it
anyway, the critics might contend, Court-imposed abolition would have
minimal meaning in the lives of African Americans or their supporters.
The principal answer to this argument is that, as Kimberlé Crenshaw
has explained, symbolism matters in the effort to dismantle the racial
hierarchy.439 She has noted that “much of what characterized Black
oppression” during the Jim Crow era “was symbolic and formal,” and the
Alan Blinder & Kevin Sack, Charleston Church Killer is Sentenced to Death, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11,
2017, at A1.
436. The modern effort can be understood to have started, although modestly, with Witherspoon v.
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968). In that case, the Court rejected the Illinois approach to exclusion of
capital jurors for mere qualms about the death penalty as overbroad under the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments. See id. at 518–23. The decision “had the effect of vacating many existing death
sentences . . . although many of these would be reimposed after new sentencing hearings.” STUART
BANNER, THE DEATH PENALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 254 (2002).
437. See supra notes 424–432 and accompanying text.
438. See Howe, supra note 382, at 2132–35 (explaining that leveling up is infeasible because of
lack of control over the main arbiters in capital selection—prosecutors and juries).
439. See Crenshaw, supra note 416, at 1378.
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elimination of those signs of subjugation (“Whites Only”) were important
even though that was woefully insufficient to bring about equality.440 The
racially discriminatory use of the death sanction is a denial of African
Americans’ “equal status under the law.”441 While the Supreme Court has
worked to make capital selection less racialized, the key to appreciating
what Court abolition could symbolize is to recognize that the death
penalty, as an institution, remains to those familiar with its heritage a
symbol of white supremacy.442 The Court need only lay out the connection
between the sanction and our history of racial subjugation to further
emphasize that meaning when abolishing the death penalty. Moreover,
before the death penalty for aggravated murder dwindles even more
significantly,443 the Court could pursue the synergistic symbolism that
would come with simultaneous abolition of the sanction and robust
atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy.444
V.

IMPLEMENTING THE PLAN AS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

In this Part, this Article proposes a way for the Supreme Court to pursue
robust atonement for Dred Scott and Plessy through substantial abolition
of capital punishment. This Part first describes an approach for
constructing constitutional meaning by which the Court could justify
substantial abolition. This Part then proposes how the Court in the process
could strive for expiation.
A.

Combining Clauses to Justify Substantial Abolition

As a matter of constitutional law, substantial abolition of capital
punishment could rest on an interpretive approach that is novel in the
440. Id.
441. Cholbi & Madva, supra note 422, at 518.
442. See JACKSON, supra note 27, at 78 (“‘The death penalty’ says Bryan Stevenson, Director of
the Alabama Equal Justice Initiative, ‘symbolizes whom we fear and don’t fear, whom we care about
and whose lives are not valid.’”).
443. As Carol and Jordan Steiker have noted, truly nationwide abolition of the death penalty is
unlikely to occur soon except through a Supreme Court ruling grounded on the Constitution. See
STEIKER & STEIKER, supra note 11, at 256–58. This seems true as well regarding the application of
the sanction to aggravated murder. However, the use of the penalty may continue to dwindle.
444. Using partial abolition as the context for atonement would also allow the Court to avoid
focusing on the more controversial aspects of deciding what equality means. Because our history of
white hegemony has disadvantaged African Americans to the benefit of whites, it is debatable how to
apply the Constitution to promote equality. Is the Constitution colorblind or does it allow actions to
counter the historical subjugation of African Americans? See Harris, supra note 51, at 222
(“Colorblind equality, like ‘separate but equal’ renders racial inequality virtually irremediable.”).
Abolishing the death penalty for aggravated murder does not implicate that problem. Abolition would
ensure that the death penalty is not used to deprive African Americans of equal status under the law.
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death-penalty context but that the Court has used in other areas:
combining constitutional clauses.445 In the death penalty context, the
Court could aggregate the equal protection mandate and the prohibition
on cruel and unusual punishments. Support exists for this approach from
a variety of Court decisions outside of the death-penalty arena, including
several that overturned laws promoting discrimination based on race and
sexual orientation.446 This clause-aggregation methodology would also
solve some central problems that the Court has noted as reasons not to
substantially restrict the use of the death penalty under a singleclause methodology.447
1.

Precedents for Clause Aggregation

In several cases, the Supreme Court has aggregated constitutional
clauses to create new fundamental rights.448 While the most prominent,
recent endorsement of clause combination came in the Obergefell
decision finding a right to same-sex marriage,449 the Court has used the
methodology in varied contexts, including to support rights of criminal
defendants.450 For example, the Court has combined the ideals of due
process and equal protection to ensure effective access by indigent,
criminal defendants to appellate courts.451 Likewise, the Court has
445. See supra notes 28–33 and accompanying text.
446. See infra notes 448–464 and accompanying text.
447. See infra notes 465–481 and accompanying text.
448. See generally Howe, supra note 28, at 830–44 (discussing various Supreme Court decisions
that employed rights-based clause aggregation).
449. See supra notes 29–31 and accompanying text.
450. Perhaps the most famous example of transparent clause aggregation occurred in Griswold v.
Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), where the Court recognized a right of married couples to use
contraception. See id. at 484–86. Justice Douglas, for the majority, identified the right in the safeguard
for “privacy surrounding the marriage relationship” created by “penumbras[] formed by emanations”
from the First, Third, Fourth, and Ninth Amendments. Id. Griswold has been severely criticized,
among other reasons, for failing adequately to explain “how a series of specified rights combined to
create a new and unspecified right.” Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment
Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 9 (1971); see also Robert G. Dixon, Jr., The “New” Substantive Due Process
and the Democratic Ethic: A Prolegomenon, 1976 BYU L. REV. 43, 84 (1976) (criticizing Griswold
on similar grounds). For the view, however, that the Griswold approach actually had “legitimacy and
vitality,” see Stephen Kanter, The Griswold Diagrams: Toward a Unified Theory of Constitutional
Rights, 28 CARDOZO L. REV. 623, 624 (2006).
451. See Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 356–58 (1963) (citing the ideals of due process and
equal protection together to reject state requirement that indigent, criminal defendants pay for their
counsel on appeals of right); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (relying on combination of
Due Process Clause and Equal Protection Clause to reject state requirement that indigent, criminal
defendants pay for their trial transcripts as a condition of appeal); see also Halbert v. Michigan, 545
U.S. 605, 610 (2005) (declaring that the Court’s earlier decisions regarding indigent access to appeals
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combined rights to freedom “of speech and press” and rights to “privacy”
(each also based on multiple clauses) to support a right to be free from
criminal prosecution for private, home viewing of obscene
pornography.452 In addition, the Court has relied on both due process and
equal protection concerns to find a right to be free of criminal prosecution
for engaging in intimate sexual contact with a person of the same sex.453
The Court also has used clause aggregation to reject some of its old
decisions that, along with Dred Scott and Plessy, supported the racial
hierarchy.454 An example is Loving v. Virginia,455 which, as we have seen,
struck down Virginia miscegenation statutes that criminalized interracial
marriage and that also rejected the old Pace decision that had upheld
racially-discriminatory laws criminalizing adultery.456 In Loving, the
Court declared that the miscegenation statutes were “so directly
subversive of the principle of equality” as to “deprive all the State’s
citizens of liberty without due process of law.”457 That declaration hinted
of clause aggregation, and, in Obergefell, the Court looked back at Loving
and declared that the “dynamic” that resulted from the “interrelation of
the two principles” helped explain the holding.458
Clause combination at times also has helped members of the Court who
favor originalism acknowledge new rights. For example, in the Dale
case,459 the Court combined the right of free expression and the right of
reflect “both equal protection and due process concerns”); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 120 (1996)
(“We observe . . . that the Court’s decisions concerning access to judicial processes, commencing
with Griffin . . . reflect both equal protection and due process concerns.”); Bearden v. Georgia, 461
U.S. 660, 665 (1983) (declaring that principles from the two clauses “converge[d]” in the “analysis
[of] these cases”); Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 608–09 (1974) (declaring that the explanation for
Griffin and Douglas was clause combination, “some support being derived from the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and some from the Due Process Clause of that Amendment”).
452. Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969). See also Howe, supra note 28, at 838
(discussing the clause aggregation employed in Stanley).
453. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. __, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015) (asserting that Lawrence
“drew upon principles of liberty and equality to define and protect . . . rights of gays and lesbians”);
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 575–79 (2003).
454. An example of such a decision, based on both notions of liberty and equality, and thus, due
process and equal protection, is Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666–70 (1966),
where the Court rejected a state poll tax of $1.50; see also Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson,
316 U.S. 535 (1942) (invalidating under both notions a law that allowed sterilization of habitual
criminals). For more on Harper and its effective undermining of the Williams decision that came two
years after Plessy, see supra notes 249–255 and accompanying text.
455. 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
456. See supra notes 151–152 and accompanying text.
457. Loving, 388 U.S. at 12.
458. Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2603.
459. See Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, 647 (2000) (recognizing a freedom of
expressive association).
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association to acknowledge a right of “expressive association” that
enabled the Boy Scouts to exclude gay men from membership.460 “The
most originalist-oriented Justices, Thomas and Scalia, joined Chief Justice
Rehnquist’s opinion for the Court without expressed concern that it was
anti-originalist.”461 Their willingness to endorse the clause-aggregation
methodology to reach a desired outcome is, perhaps, not surprising.462
Rights-based clause combination parallels other traditional strategies that
the Court has employed in giving meaning to the Constitution, such as
focusing on structure or on the restraining effect of one clause
on another.463
In the end, cases in which the Court has used clause combination
outside of the death-penalty context can support the use of the approach
to substantially abolish the death penalty. Commentators have noted that
the methodology is under-theorized in the Court’s jurisprudence; the
justices have chosen to employ the approach in some circumstances and
not others, and the explanations for those choices do not appear in the
Court’s opinions.464 Nonetheless, nothing about abolition of the death
penalty for aggravated murder makes the application of a clausecombination rationale improper.

460. See supra notes 32–33 and accompanying text.
461. Howe, supra note 28, at 879.
462. We should recognize, moreover, that any claim that there is an original meaning of the Equal
Protection Clause or of the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause that would prevent their
combination to substantially abolish the death penalty would be an alternative form of creative
construction. There is no consensus that either clause has a well-defined, original meaning. See, e.g.,
Mark V. Tushnet, Equal Protection, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES 297, 297 (Kermit Hall ed., 2d ed. 2005) (concerning the Equal Protection Clause);
Scott W. Howe, Furman’s Mythical Mandate, 40 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 435, 461 (2007) (concerning
the Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause).
463. See Michael Coenen, Combining Constitutional Clauses, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1095–101
(2016) (contending that “combination analysis shares significant functional features with two widely
utilized tools of constitutional decisionmaking: namely, the constitutional avoidance canon and
arguments based on constitutional structure”).
464. See, e.g., Kerry Abrams & Brandon L. Garrett, Cumulative Constitutional Rights, VA. PUB.
L. & LEGAL THEORY, at 26–27 (Research Paper No. 42, 2016) (discussing the idea of
“intersectional[ity]” between clauses but noting that in Obergefell, the Court “did not . . . define what
the intersectional right consists in”); Howe, supra note 28, at 854–56 (concluding that “the Court
chooses when to employ clause aggregation from among the cases where it is plausibly employed,
and the factors that influence that choice are unspoken by the Court and typically non-evident to the
observer”); Kanter, supra note 450, at 624 (noting that the use of clause aggregation in Griswold “was
rather vaguely and poorly explained”).
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The Benefits of Clause Combination

The modern death penalty embodies two related problems that unite in
revealing its heritage in the ignominious quest for white supremacy. First,
racism still infects capital punishment where it survives, as proven most
directly by the many studies showing the racialized distribution of death
sentences, but also by the punishment’s geographical correlation with the
historical use of racial-hatred lynchings.465 Second, increasing public
concerns over inequality and unfairness have contributed to a growing
societal resistance to the use of capital punishment, a development that
has progressively undermined the penological rationales for the sanction
and underscored, again, that a more sinister rationale probably helps
explain its survival.466 The Court has concluded that the racial-disparity
problem is inadequate to make out a constitutional violation without
proving a racially-discriminatory purpose,467 which is rarely possible.468
Likewise, the Court has indicated that the dwindling-use concern makes
out no constitutional violation at least until the sanction becomes so
substantially rejected across the nation that the Court can conclude that a
societal consensus has developed against it.469 Yet the racializeddistribution problem and the dwindling-use problem together reveal a
more profound infirmity regarding the modern death penalty: it would
doubtfully exist as a punishment for aggravated murder absent a
longstanding wrong (the racial hierarchy) that the Court wrongfully
endorsed in Dred Scott and Plessy.470
Clause combination would empower the Court to substantially reject
the death penalty based on this larger infirmity. According to the Court,
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor the Cruel and Unusual

465. See supra notes 373–413 and accompanying text.
466. See supra notes 414–432 and accompanying text.
467. See McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 292 (1987) (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment
required proof from the petitioner “that the decisionmaker[] in his case acted with discriminatory
purpose”); id. at 308 (asserting that, since Georgia’s death-penalty system complied with the Court’s
precedents on capital-selection, “we lawfully may presume” that his death sentence did not violate
the Eighth Amendment).
468. See John Charles Boger, McCleskey v. Kemp: Field Notes from 1977–1991, 112 NW. U. L.
REV. 1637, 1678 (2018) (“McCleskey effectively closed the book, not only on further racial challenges
in capital sentencing but, far more broadly, on empirical racial challenges in other kinds of criminal
cases.”); Paul Butler, Equal Protection and White Supremacy, 112 NW. U. L. REV. 1457, 1461 (2018)
(describing the challenge of proving discrimination as “really difficult” although not “impossible”).
469. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 579–81 (2005) (finding objective evidence in
support of a societal consensus against the use of capital punishment for juvenile offenders); CARTER
ET AL., supra note 379, at 37–39 (describing the Court’s application of this test).
470. See supra notes 402–404 and accompanying text.
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Punishments Clause individually can justify substantial abolition.471 Yet
clause combination can enable the Court to justify protections that neither
clause alone could support,472 and the concerns of each of those two
clauses are heavily implicated by the institution of capital punishment.473
We could plausibly conclude that the racial-disparities problem goes far
toward revealing an equal-protection violation. Likewise, we could
plausibly conclude that the dwindling-use problem almost reveals the
violation of a societal consensus and thus, the Eighth Amendment.
Further, the related implication that the wrongful quest to maintain white
supremacy helped capital punishment survive (and vice versa) gives
reason to combine some of the force from each of the clauses and reject
the sanction for aggravated murder.474 Because of the iniquity of states’
efforts to subjugate African Americans and of Dred Scott and Plessy, the
Court would properly resolve uncertainty over whether capital
punishment would have survived had those wrongs never happened in
favor of abolition.
The clause-aggregation approach would also avoid additional
impediments to substantial abolition that would arise under a singleclause methodology. First, the Court could distinguish, rather than
overrule, its prior decisions involving systemic challenges to the death
penalty. The most salient is McCleskey v. Kemp,475 where the Court
confronted evidence from the Baldus study indicating pronounced racial
discrimination in the Georgia capital-sentencing system.476 The

471. See supra notes 467–469 and accompanying text.
472. For a “systemic examination of combination analysis in U.S. constitutional law,” or what I
call a “clause aggregation” or “clause combination” methodology, see Coenen, supra note 463, at
1068; see also Ariel Porat & Eric A. Posner, Aggregation and Law, 122 YALE L.J. 2, 48–49 (2012)
(describing the idea of “hybrid rights” in constitutional law as an instance of “cross-claim normative
aggregation”).
473. Michael Coenen contends that it is not insensible to conclude that a law almost violates—or
only “barely” complies with—the demands of a particular clause. See Coenen, supra note 463, at
1095. This conclusion, he notes, depends on our “metaphysical picture” of the clauses. See id. “Some
of us might prefer to compare the clauses to on/off switches, whereas others might prefer to compare
them to sliding scales.” Id. Yet there is no “right” or “wrong” perspective on the metaphysical
structure of the clauses; “there are only different metaphors that we may or may not choose to
employ.” Id.
474. Combining the force of the two clauses to support partial abolition does not violate any norm
from the natural order. See id. at 1067 (“Just as my limited desire to see a movie and my limited desire
to buy clothes might together yield an overwhelming desire to go to the mall, so too might clauses
providing limited individual support for a judicial result operate together to generate strong collective
support for th[e] result.” (footnote omitted)).
475. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
476. See supra notes 385–393 and accompanying text.
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McCleskey Court analyzed and rejected claims based on that evidence
brought separately under the Equal Protection and Cruel and Unusual
Punishments Clauses.477 However, the Court did not address whether a
hybrid-clause basis existed to reject the death penalty as a descendant of
the racial hierarchy. Likewise, the Court’s other decisions in which it has
rejected calls to abolish or substantially abolish the death penalty have not
addressed such a claim and are thus, also distinguishable.478
The complexity of the dual-clause approach would also help allay
concerns that the ruling might cast constitutional doubts on the larger
criminal-justice system.479 In McCleskey, Justice Powell, for the majority,
asserted that “if we accepted McCleskey’s claim . . . we could soon be
faced with similar claims as to other types of penalty,” and he anticipated
arguments grounded on “unexplained discrepancies that correlate to
membership in other minority groups, and even to gender.”480 In dissent,
Justice Brennan characterized this concern as “a fear of too much
justice.”481 With the complexities introduced by the dual-clause theory of
the death penalty’s invalidity, racial or non-racial discrimination
regarding other criminal penalties is easily differentiated. Imagine, for
example, a claim challenging a sentence of incarceration and alleging
gender discrimination in the relative level of use of incarceration as
opposed to probation. A dual-clause ruling from the Court substantially
abolishing the death penalty based on our racial history would not apply
to that problem, if only because incarceration is not dwindling to the point
of being widely abandoned as a punishment.
B.

Incorporating Confession and Apology

An opinion substantially abolishing the death penalty based on its
connection to the quest for white supremacy would allow the Court’s
justices to effectively pursue institutional expiation for Dred Scott and
477. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 292 (addressing the equal protection claim); id. at 308 (addressing
the Eighth Amendment claim).
478. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 198 (1976) (opinion of Stewart, J., Powell, J. &
Stevens, J.); id. at 222 (White, J., concurring) (upholding against a facial challenge under the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments a statute that required a judge or jury to find at least
one statutory aggravating factor and to consider mitigating evidence before imposing a death sentence
on a convicted capital offender); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239–40 (1972) (per curiam)
(concluding that standardless capital sentencing violates the prohibition on cruel and unusual
punishments); McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 196 (1971) (rejecting due process challenge to
standardless capital sentencing).
479. By adding complexity to the supporting rationale, clause combination can help confine the
“precedential sweep” of a ruling. Coenen, supra note 463, at 1104.
480. McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 315–17 (footnote omitted).
481. Id. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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Plessy. This Article has proposed that there are four important parts to the
effort: (1) confession of fundamental errors by the Court; (2) confession
of the associated harms; (3) transparent apology; and (4) concrete action
to indicate sincerity.482 Substantial abolition of the death penalty would
satisfy the last requirement.483 Part V also has explained why substantially
ending capital punishment would provide a relevant context for fulfilling
the first three requirements.484 Nonetheless, this final section focuses on
aspects of fulfilling the first two requirements involving confession and
the third involving transparent apology.
As for confession of past errors regarding Dred Scott and Plessy, this
Article urges that the Court not cast those actions as simply the
questionable products of a bygone era that the Court would not repeat
today. To express disagreement with those opinions but suggest that they
were plausible when rendered is to fail to take institutional responsibility
for them as iniquities. While the current justices obviously did not
participate in Dred Scott or Plessy, they are in charge of the Court’s
present ownership of its institutional history. To best fulfill that
institutional responsibility, the proposal is that the Court identify the
errors in Dred Scott and Plessy and, without equivocation, characterize
them as atrocities.
Regarding confession of the associated harms, this Article advises that
the Court acknowledge that Dred Scott and Plessy made it complicit in
the violent degradation of African Americans. This means confessing,
first, to complicity in general. The Court should admit that it joined forces
with the white supremacists and became responsible for all of the
foreseeable consequences of the color-line and the segregation regime.
Those consequences extended not only to a denial of equal opportunities
but to the psychic and physical brutality inflicted on African Americans.
The Court could not describe the full extent of the horrors, but it could
summarize them. It could also offer some specific instances of the trauma
inflicted from the perspective of African Americans. In Missouri’s Black
Heritage, for example, Professor Lorenzo Greene, a distinguished
African-American historian, described his painfully insulting introduction
to the white people of Jefferson City, Missouri, in 1933, after arriving by
train from New York City to join the faculty at Lincoln University.485
Within minutes, he was called a racial slur, denied a taxi ride, and refused

482. See supra text accompanying note 15.
483. See supra text accompanying notes 20–27.
484. See supra Part V.
485. See GREENE ET AL., supra note 65, at 1–2.
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service in a restaurant.486 In I Know Why the Caged Bird Sings, Maya
Angelou described witnessing as a ten-year old in the late 1930s “the most
painful and confusing experience” she ever had with her grandmother.487
She watched her “Momma” ordered about and mocked and insulted at her
store in Stamps, Arkansas, by white children, and saw her confront the
abuse with equanimity by quietly singing prayerful hymns.488 In Brown v.
Mississippi,489 the Court itself described the torture of two AfricanAmerican men to extract “confessions” that were used to secure their
death sentences.490 The Brown case also exemplifies the sham capital
proceedings that descended from the lynchings that were used in the Jim
Crow era to intimidate African Americans and their supporters. In the
Equal Justice Initiative’s Report on Lynchings, the authors, led by Bryan
Stevenson, recount the grisly details of some of the thousands of spectacle
lynchings against African Americans that occurred during the era of de
jure segregation.491 A representative example concerns the three-hour,
torture lynching of Lation Scott (for an alleged “assault”), across from the
courthouse in Dyersburg, Tennessee, attended by thousands of whites,
including children. The authors report: “A mob tortured Mr. [Lation] Scott
with a hot poker iron, gouging out his eyes, shoving the hot poker down
his throat and pressing it all over his body before castrating him and
burning him alive over a slow fire.”492
Regarding apology itself, this Article advocates that it be emphatic and
unconditional, although institutional. It would be inadequate simply to say
that Dred Scott and Plessy and the associated harms were “regrettable.”
There is value in more clearly pursuing redemption through a direct and
forceful apology.
CONCLUSION
This Article has presented two principal proposals that interconnect. It
began by inquiring whether and ultimately finding that the Supreme Court
should do more to atone for its endorsement of the color-line and de jure
segregation in Dred Scott and Plessy. The Court will fail adequately to
pursue expiation until it offers a transparent confession of errors and of
the associated harms, an institutional apology, and some further action to
486. See id. Professor Greene’s mistreatment occurred only miles from where Dred Scott earlier
experienced the insult of the Court’s Dred Scott opinion. See supra text accompanying notes 64–73.
487. MAYA ANGELOU, I KNOW WHY THE CAGED BIRD SINGS 28 (1969).
488. See id. at 28–33.
489. 297 U.S. 278, 279–85 (1936).
490. Id.
491. See EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE’S REPORT ON LYNCHING, supra note 20, at 51–68.
492. Id. at 35.
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underscore its sincerity. The Article then asked what vehicle the Court
might use to pursue atonement and concluded that a Court opinion
substantially abolishing capital punishment would provide an especially
appropriate context. The sanction is widely understood as tied to a history
of black subjugation; and, indeed, we cannot refute that capital
punishment for murder would have disappeared by now but for the
judicially endorsed quest for white supremacy. Even were the Court not
to apologize, substantial abolition of the death penalty is justified on that
basis under a methodology for constructing constitutional meaning that
combines partial forces from the equal protection mandate and the
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments. From that perspective, the
Article might be understood as primarily an argument for substantial
abolition of the death penalty and only secondarily as an argument for
Supreme Court expiation. Yet the Article urges an understanding that
gives primacy to neither proposal. The larger theme has been that the
Court might achieve something unusually valuable by pursuing the
synergistic symbolism that would come with simultaneous restriction of
the death sanction and robust atonement for the violence of Dred Scott
and Plessy.

